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ABSTRACT
The following thesis develops the idea of “constructive destruction” in close readings of 
selected texts by Spren Kierkegaard, Theodor W. Adorno, Franz Kafka, Gershom Scholem 
and Philip Roth.
1. The focus on the study is on “suffering” and “constructive destruction” in the “modern” 
period, which means that “suffering” is being understood primarily as internal (respectively)- _ 
existential suffering.
2. Kierkegaard’s “The Sickness unto Death” is a typical example of this very kind of 
suffering. Kierkegaard’s theoretical treatise of suffering in this writing is problematic, though 
I argue that a close inspection of his literary strategy of pseudonymity allows for a more 
positive evaluation of his contribution.
3. The reading of Adorno’s reading of Kierkegaaid introduces the idea of constructive 
destruction, for Adorno has attempted to wring the positive out of the collapse of 
Kierkegaard’s “system.”
4. Kafka’s aphorisms are the source of the term “constmctive destruction.” They were written 
in a time of severe crisis, and they develop this idea particularly in reflections about the 
im/possibility of dying. Kafka’s work was related to philosophical and religious ideas of 
constructive destruction by Maurice Blanchot and, more extensively, by Gershom Scholem: 
Scholem sees Kafka’s work as a (in his times) contemporary form of heretical Kabbalah, for 
which Sabbatianisms is a prime example; Sabbatianism, again, enacts constructive 
destruction.
5. Philip Roth’s novel “Sabbath’s Theatre” may or may not play with the name of founder of 
this Jewish sect. Either way it can be read as a contemporary reflection of the logic of 
constructive destruction as response to suffering.
6. My selection of texts and my method of reading are unconventional but not random. The 
method is located at the crossroad of philosophy of religion and literature and inspired by 
what I call differential analogy. The result of my reading is not a recipe for the overcoming of 
suffering; rather, I provide models for meaningful responses to suffering that can inspire our 
perceptions of the conflicts that we may (quite likely) face in one way or another.
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1. Introduction
Life entails suffering -  now and then, to say the least. The following essay on 
suffering does not claim that life is always and at every instance suffering. And yet if 
it is the case that suffering does make its appearance in human lives now and then, 
then human beings need orientation about how to deal with suffering in a sensible 
and ultimately promising way.
The present study is not about suffering “as such”, if there is such a thing. I do 
not know what is going on inside of the “head” that is, in the central nervous system, 
of somebody who suffers from pain. Neurophysiology does have means to explore 
the neurological processes that are triggered by experiences of pain, and these could 
be tantamount to suffering, but the present study is not informed by neurophysiology. 
It may be felt that the reflection about suffering is meaningless and completely 
inappropriate, because suffering must be ended and that is all there is to say about it. 
And yet people do reflect and talk about suffering. The present study is dedicated to 
those who are confronted with their own or with other persons’ reflections about 
suffering. To be confronted with an ongoing reflection about suffering necessitates a 
response, one way or the other. Of course we can say that the reflection is inevitably 
inapt with respect to the immediate experience of suffering. But if we do so, than we 
let those who respond to suffering with reflection fall back into the isolation whence 
their words have made a journey out into the open. ^
Expressed in terms of semiotics, the present study is not about the referent of the 
signifier /suffering/. The referent of the signifier /suffering/, again, could only be a 
subject of medical science. Neither, in contrast, is this study primarily concerned 
with the signifier /suffering/^. I do offer an analysis of the function of the signifier 
/suffering/ in Kierkegaard’s work^, but this exploration has a heuristic function. Its 
aim is to make us sensitive to fundamental problems that may be related to the use of 
that term. The primary concern of the following work, in contrast, is the signified 
“suffering”, i.e., the cultural construct that is associated with that term, or the ideas 
and concepts that could appeal" under the heading “suffering”
The signified “suffering” has a broad extension. In what follows, I will 
concentrate on particularly “modern” conceptualisations of suffering, which means,
En passant I would like to mention that “suffering” could be a test for our confidence in 
communication as such: if  we do not trust our -  admittedly inapt -  discourses about the ineffable 
experience o f suffering, then this may be an occasion to ask what we actually do expect from our 
communication.
 ^In semiotics, signifiers are often printed in slashes (/).
 ^See p. 15ff.
The “signified” is often confused with the “referent”. I am using the terminology offered by 
Ferdinand de Saussure.
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suffering with respect to interiority, or existential suffering.^ “Modernity” is intended 
to refer to a historical condition in which the subject becomes aware of itself and 
reflects upon itself. I am aware that this definition is disputable, but I do think that 
authors like Kierkegaard and Kafka, who appear to express “our” modem condition 
pointedly, do support such an understanding of “modernity.”
Against the backdrop of these deliberations, I would like to explain the title of 
the thesis. The word “response” emphasises that I am not dealing with suffering as 
such but with cultural responses to suffering. “Constructive destmction”, a phrase 
borrowed from Kafka, will prove to be a promising response to suffering. 
Constructive destruction plainly means that a process that at first sight appears to be 
(solely) destructive is effectively heading in a constmctive direction. I call my study 
“Prolegomena” because it forms the first step of a more extensive project that I have 
commenced, i.e., a comprehensive account for the overcoming of suffering featuring 
this very notion of “constructive destruction”. The word “concept” is printed in 
quotation marks because it is obviously inadequate, for disaster eludes 
conceptualisation. I use this word nonetheless in order to communicate that this work 
has a theoretical and constmctive aim; it is not merely a reconstruction of that which 
others have said about this theme. “Salutary Disaster” is of course an oxymoron. The 
configuration of these terms parallels the phrase “constmctive destruction”, though it 
is supposed to indicate that I am not concerned with a theoretical antinomy, but 
rather with the lives of human beings.
The present study simultaneously belongs to philosophy, the philosophy of 
religion and literary studies. The eventual outcome of this overall project will offer a 
reinterpretation of theorems that are traditionally dealt with within the study of 
theology. I do not know whether the ideas that I present are themselves already 
theological, or whether they are merely potentially inspiring for theology. When I say “I 
do not know”, I mean that I am suspended in between mutually exclusive ideas of what 
“theology” is. Some of these emphasise the distinctiveness of theology and of its 
axioms, others emphasise that theology is interwoven into “other” disciplines. Before I 
can ailiculate the implications of my preliminary ideas for a “genuinely” theological 
reflection of suffering^, I would need to have settled these questions.
 ^ “Existential” suffering, again, is distinct from immediate physical pain respectively suffering in so 
far as immediate physical suffering is neither reflexive nor discursive. -  My concern is not with 
suffering that is caused by external circumstances, which would require for a different (political and 
ethical) kind of study. And yet that kind o f study, again, could be related to “genuinely” theological 
themes such as “lamentation”. See Soelle (1973), 94 et. al.
® On Suffering in theology, see Gerstenberger / Schrage (1977); Oelmiiller (1986).
’ Meister Eckliait (1994), 72.
 ^St. John of the Cross (1964), 587.
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1.1. A short refutation of the embrace of suffering
A few comments will be made about the kind of response to suffering that I will 
deliberately exclude from this essay. I am referring to the medieval idea of sacred 
pain or blessed suffering, which can be found e.g. in Meister Eckhart and St. John of 
the Cross, but also in contemporary works. Meister Eckhart’s The Book o f Divine 
Consolations and St. John of the Cross’s The Living Flame o f Love teach us a lot 
about how suffering was viewed at their time. Both of these texts, in spite of their 
diverseness, share fundamental traits: Suffering will have been good. By destroying 
the ties of the self to the fallen world, suffering opens and purifies. Rather than 
reviewing these works in their entirety, I will look at one paiticular metaphor that 
could suffice to express why the following essay will aim to take a different route 
from these two writers.
Meister Eckhart likens suffering to a fire which consumes those parts of the 
human being that are unlike God. He describes how a log, if it is put into the fire, 
spits and rebels against the fire as long as it is unlike it; as soon as the log becomes 
like the fire, the labor (my phrase) ends.
When the fire acts, igniting the wood and setting it ablaze, then the fire reduces the wood to 
something small, quite unlike itself, removing from it its bulk, coldness, mass and moistness, 
and making the wood more and more like itself. And yet neither the fire nor the wood is 
satisfied or contented with any warmth, heat or likeness until the fire has given birth to itself 
in the wood and has conveyed to it its own nature and its own being so that all becomes a 
single fire, equally one, without distinction and knowing neither increase nor decrease. And 
this is why, until the process is complete, there is always smoke, crackling and contention 
between the fire and the wood. But when all the differences between them have been 
removed, the fire is still and the wood is silent.^
The fire, then, burns off the difference between God and man; it destroys that which 
gives rise to suffering, thus enacting what one could call a “salutaiy negativity”. 
According to Meister Eckhart, suffering is like a fire that is required to make the 
human being like God, which would be a state where suffering will be conquered for 
good.
St. John of the Cross, in spite of living three centuries after Meister Eckhart and 
differing from him in many respects, reveals comparable views about the function of 
suffering. In his “The Living Flame of Love”, he even refers to this very same 
metaphor:
Now with the light and heat of the divine fire, it sees and feels those weaknesses and 
miseries which previously resided within it, hidden and unfelt, just as the dampness of the 
log of wood was unknown until the fire being applied to it made it sweat and smoke and 
sputter. And this is what the flame does to the imperfect soul.®
...ili
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This portrayal of the meaning of suffering in Meister Eckhait’s and in St. John of the 
Cross’s works is powerful yet bmtal. One could argue that the metaphor of fire is 
rather dangerous.^ But even in spite of this problem, I would argue that these 
conceptualisations are particularly hai'd to communicate in our times.
The point that both Meister Eckhart and St. John of the Cross aie trying to make 
is that the journey towards God may lead through suffering, which means, though, 
that there is a positive aspect in the negative experience that will eventually prevail. 
This means that formally speaking, the transformation of the negative into the 
positive, which is the undercurrent of the metaphor of salutary fire, would need to be , 
spelled out in terms that are communicable in our times. This may be a very strong 
challenge, for we experience our world in quite a different way from the mystics. 
The mystics “knew” that suffering is a symptom of “a sickness that is not unto 
death”, respectively a sickness that will, thus St. John of the Cross, lead through 
death to the glory of God.
The first step of love makes the soul sick in an advantageous way. [...] Yet this sickness is 
not unto death but for the glory of the Lord [Jn. 11:6]‘\  because in this sickness the soul’s 
languor pertains to sin and things that aie not God.*^
In this respect, mysticism relies on transcendental assumptions about the source and 
destiny of life that are no longer self-evident to us.‘^  The sickness remains, but in a 
critical age, it worsens and becomes a “Sickness that is unto Death”, or rather, a
 ^I will name one recent example to flesh out this claim: In his inauguration speech for his second term 
o f office, George Bush said: “By our efforts we have lit a fire as well; a fire in the minds of men. It 
warms those who feel its power. It burns those who fight its progress. And one day this untamed fire 
of freedom will reach the daikest corners of our world.” (Bush 2005) The synopsis of a recent 
example o f a kind o f demagogic rhetoric should alert us. The similarity is uncomfortable: For George 
Bush, the fire of “freedom” (as defined by US-American world politics) is beneficial to those who are 
inclined to it, while it will haunt those who aie not (as yet). Drawing this connection between 
medieval mysticism and contemporain political rhetoric does not mean to imply that they amount to 
the same. I did, however, mean to show that the rhetoric of fire is prone to abuse.
Denys Turner has offered a very stimulating reading o f St. John o f the Cross (and o f other 
“apophatic” writers) that relates their thoughts to postmodern ideas (Turner (1999), 8): The critique of 
the (modern) prioritisation o f the I is a or rather the Leitmotif of his study. With respect to St. John of 
the Cross’s view on human (religious) suffering in his “The dark Night of the Soul”, Turner points out 
that this negative “experience” itself questions the alleged experientialism: Both depression and the 
dai'k nights aie. Turner points out, experiences of a loss of identity. But while the depressed person 
hopes for a restoration o f his or her self-image, “the passive nights ‘deconstruct’ not only the given 
self of experience, but also the ‘therapeutic’ self, the ‘woundable’ self, which is implicit in that self of  
experience.” (Turner (1999), 237) On first sight, Turner’s reading appears to relate St. John o f the 
cross to our intellectual situation. But upon closer inspection, Turner seems to take this salutary 
function o f the “dark night” for granted, contrasting it to the “therapeutical” self. In this respect, his 
reading eventually does not make St. John o f the Cross more accessible for a contemporary account 
for suffering, which I would argue ought not to divide the actual experience o f the suffering individual 
from the perspective that religious practice might reveal to that experience.
“ On Kierkegaaid’s reference to this verse, see below note 51.
St. John o f the Cross (1964), 373.
I would argue that this is the case in spite o f the fact that St. John o f the Cross’s thought can have a 
certain force in fictional literature. See Fiddes (1991), 183.
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sickness that never ends, not even in death, but is stuck between life and death like 
Kafka’s Hunter Gracchus.
In conclusion, I would argue that the mystic embrace of suffering can hai'dly be 
communicated in our times. There are, of course, also contemporary authors who 
embrace suffering. I will name only two examples: Romano Guardini, a Catholic 
philosopher of religion, and Emmanuel Levinas, a Jewish phenomenologist.’"^ 
Romano Guardini points out that there is a “heaviness of things” that comes with 
melancholy and that can give things their own gravity by enhancing in s ig h t .In  his 
study about eschatology and purification, Guardini explains how “purificiation” , 
conceptualises the abolishment of negative aspects of mankind; Guardini concludes 
that no “righteous” person could claim that he was unable to relate to that.'^ The very 
idea of a “heaviness of things” relies on idealist assumptions about a ground of being 
that are far from self-evident to us. Furthermore, Guardini’s moralist argumentation 
lacks evidence in our times, in which the foundations of morals have become 
unstable.
For Emmanuel Levinas, suffering is endless, because any relation to the other 
that does not entail suffering must ‘infinitely’ fall short:
The intention toward another, when it has reached its peak, turns out to belie intentionality. 
Toward another culminates mfor another, a suffering for his suffering, without light, that is, 
without measure. [.. .]^ ®
The subject must take over an unending pain, it is “bound to the adversity or 
suffering of pain. [...] The subjectivity of a subject is vulnerability, exposure to 
affection, sensibility Levinas uses crass metaphors to describe how he
envisions this exposure.
To revert oneself [...] is to empty oneself anew to oneself, to absolve oneself, like in a 
hemophiliac’s haemorrhage.^^
Subjectivity then means “making a gift of my own skin.” '^ Pronouncements such as 
these illustrate the consequences of concepts that attribute meaning to suffering and
Along similar lines, Simone Weil suggested that one should love the God who is the source of evil 
(see Ewertowski (1994), 258).
Guardini (2003), 40.
Guardini (2002), 52f.
Even though exploring philosophical presuppositions sceptically, Denys Turner also endorses an 
appreciation o f  pain that I find problematic. Summarising his synoptic reading o f Plato’s allegory of 
the cave and o f M oses’s ascent to Mount Sinai in Ex 19ff., Turner concludes that “[i]n both the 
Allegory and in Exodus, there is an ascent toward a brilliant light, a light so excessive as to cause 
pain, distress and darkness: a darkness o f knowledge deeper than any which is the darkness of 
ignorance. The price o f the pure contemplation o f the light is therefore darkness, even, as in exodus, 
death, but not the darkness of the absence of light, rather of its excess -  therefore a ‘luminous 
darkness’. (Turner (1999), 17f.)
'^Levinas (1981), 18.
'^Levinas (1981), 50.
^"Levinas (1981), 92.
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“fail” (as I would put it) to articulate the need for the overcoming of suffering?^ 
Again, I am aware that suffering cannot always be overcome, but I will reject a kind 
of thought that completely fades out any hope for the overcoming of suffering by 
glorifying it.
1.2. Demarcating the field
I will shortly demarcate the field of my study negatively with regard to the question 
concerning which issues I do not intend to tackle. To comment on “suffering” and to 
try to find meaning in it may appear to concern the theological locus of theodicy.^^ 
However, the following work does not intend to comment on the intrinsic meaning of 
negative events and experiences; rather, it staifs off from the observation that there 
are negative experiences and events and that these trigger existential processes. It is 
with these existential processes that the following work is concerned; the existence 
of negativity is being presupposed. The fact that negativity can engender meaningful 
journeys to selfhood does not imply any ontological assumptions about negativity.
Accordingly, the following essay describes models that make sense within 
particular historical constellations: Kierkegaard’s struggle with aporias is bound to 
idealistic ideas of selfhood; Kafka’s personal misery may reflect a paiticulaiiy 
modem malaise of the (socially) disintegrated subject, Adorno evaluates his age as a 
time of oppression and coercion, Philip Roth immerses himself in individual 
catastrophes that are related to a particular view on the society in the USA of the 
1990ies. Within these negative frames of references, particulai’ responses to suffering 
can be described. The structure of the responses can be compared, and particular 
elements of these stmctures may prove to be mutually illuminative. It is in 
this respect only that the following essay can claim to unearth aspects of suffering 
that are transcendental, i.e., structures the validity of which extends further than their 
particular historical context. But negativity itself, the source and the transcendent
Levinas (1981), 138.
Edith Wyschogrod has commented very carefully on what she calls the “paradox o f saintly 
suffering”; “[...]  on the one hand the saints alleviate suffering but on the other hand Impose it on 
herself/himself. Is it not the obligation of another, if  not the saint’s responsibility, to alleviate this 
personal suffering?” (Wyschogrod (1991), 38) Wyschogrod also refers to the tradition o f sacred pain, 
though in a rather descriptive kind o f way and without controversial discussion: “Extremes o f ecstasy 
and distress express the organic range of saintly corporeality, quite literally the systole and diastole of 
saintly consciousness in which the body as a whole expresses itself.” (Wyschogrod (1991), 18, with 
reference to Theresa o f Avila and Michel de Certeau)
Theodicy is an issue o f this essay only in so far that the idea o f the messianic, which is constantly 
present in Gershom Scholem ’s and Theodor W. Adorno’s thought, could be related to an 
eschatological theodicy. But this is a theoretical possibility that the following essay is not concerned 
with, for I will discuss the actual meaning o f the processes that are triggered by negativity rather than 
the question whether God respectively the world can be justified.
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meaning of suffering “as such” '^^ , remains strictly outside of this scope. Suffering 
triggers a process, and I am concerned with that process.
Furthermore, the following text does not develop the Christological dimension 
of the notion of “constructive destruction”, though I do want to point out very briefly 
how the existential idea of constructive destruction and its Christological 
correspondent relate to one another: The concept of the “death of death”, “mors 
mortis”, can be traced back to the Old Testament. Hos 13,4^^, which resounds in 1. 
Cor 14,541f.^^, was famously taken up in Luther’s phrase “Eyn spott aus dem tod ist 
worden”^^  -  “death has been ridiculed” -  and has finally inspired Hegel’s doctrine of,..,, 
the death of d e a th .I n  Luther, the logic of death of death^°, i.e., the logic of violent 
rebellion against death, is closely tied to existential dialectics, as can be seen e.g. in 
his letters of consolation. Luther writes to his ailing friend Stockhausen:
[...] The darts of the devil cannot be removed pleasantly and without effort if they are so 
deeply imbedded in your flesh. They must be torn out by force. Accordingly you must say;
“[...] to hell with dying and death.”®'
y
The dialectics of a transgression through (experienced) death is again related to t^jjer" 
salutaryjdespair^^, which prepares for Kierkegaard’s existential dialectics. Before we 
W fnto Kierkegaard, however, I will make a few more comments on the particular 
overall journey that this essay is about to embark on.
1.3. Mapping the journey
In the following essay, I will offer close readings of writings of Spren Kierkegaard, 
Theodor W. Adorno, Franz Kafka and Philip Roth. A few comments will be made
If there is such a thing as “suffering ‘as such’”.
If I were asked for my personal opinion, I would claim that suffering is an unsolvable riddle, a 
shortcoming in the world which I perceive as God’s creation. I see no need to forgive God for the 
suffering that we must blame him for. There is no end to lamentation. But lamentation already has a 
meaning for human beings, and therefore it does not remain empty, although the fissure in the world 
that lies at its heart will not be closed before the end of times.
Hos 13:14: “I will ransom them from the power of the grave; I will redeem them from death: O 
death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction: repentance shall be hid from mine 
eyes." On Hos 13.14 and its relation to the concept o f “mors mortis, see Fischer (1979); Balthasar 
(1984); Ebeling (1987).
“When this perishable body puts on imperishability, and this mortal body puts on immortality, then 
the saying that is written will be fulfilled; ‘Death has been swallowed up in victory.’” (Isa 25,7)
Evangelisches Kirchengesangbuch, nr. 76. See Krause (1982); Jüngel (1983), 93.
In contemporary philosophy of religion, the “death of death” is particularly important for the work 
of Thomas Altizer; see Altizer (1990), 70.80.84.86 etc.
Luther, W A 40/1,267,4f.: “[...]  mors devorat mortem [ .. .]”; W A 15, 218, 26f., see Jüngel (1983), 
93.
To Jonas von Stockhausen, November 27, 1532: Luther (1955), 88f.
“Ego ipse non semel offensus sum usque ad profundum et abyssum desperationis, ut optarem nunquara 
esse me creatum hominem, antequam scirem, quam salutaris ilia esset desperatio et quam gratiae 
propinqua.” (Luther (1883ff.) WA 18,719,9-12 [de servo arbitrio])\ see below p. 25.
s
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about the selection of authors. S0ren Kierkegaard can be seen as a typically modern 
suffering individual. This applies particularly to his preoccupation with the I and its 
self-relation, an issue that virtually does not exist prior to the rise of the modem 
subject. Furthermore, Kierkegaard embodies the intersection of different perspectives 
that are relevant for this work: not only does he comment extensively about 
suffering, his works are also situated at the intersection of the philosophy of religion 
and literature, which will become particularly clear in my closer exploration of the 
pseudonymity of the Sickness unto Death.
Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of the modern ailment is circumspect -  unlike the _ 
therapy that he recommends. Meaning has to be ‘wrung out o f  Kierkegaard’s 
writings, as Adorno has effectively shown. While Kierkegaard’s works primarily 
help to understand “suffering”, Adorno’s reading of Kierkegaaid is of particular 
interest for the idea of “constructive destruction” that is at the horizon of this study, 
Adorno has illustrated that and how the positive can only be gained from the 
negative; Kierkegaard may have made very similar claims, yet his theory of selfliood 
is, as Adorno shows, in itself aporetic.^^
The very idea of “constructive destruction” is taken from the aphorisms of Franz 
Kafka, written during his stay in Ziirau, where he recovered from a haemorrhage. I 
will focus on that period and look at Kafka’s response to suffering in the phase of his 
life in which he was immediately and intimately struck by suffering, i.e., when he 
had fallen sick of tuberculosis.
Kafka’s work has often been related to theology and religious studies. I will not 
reheai'se this debate on the whole. I will, however, investigate one perspective 
regarding the religious dimension of Kafka’s work, i.e., the one that Gershom 
Scholem took. Scholem described Kafka’s work as a “heretical Kabbalah”. The 17'*’ 
century’s movement of Sabbatianism is one of the prominent guises that this 
heretical Kabbalah took. What makes Scholem’s reading of Kafka particularly 
interesting is that Sabbatianism is itself an instantiation of the logic that is at the 
horizon of this study, i.e., a logic that conceptualises a constructive destruction. 
Indirectly, Maurice Blanchot seems to allude to this connection.
Sabbatianism, again, may be a phenomenon that is not quite as far away from 
“our” situation as it could appear at first glance. I will argue that Philip Roth’s novel 
Sabbath's Theater instantiates Sabbatian ideas. To what extent Roth actually meant 
to inscribe his character Mickey Sabbath into the genealogy of the heretical 
movement is an interesting though not decisive question. My reading aims to show 
that the novel configures suffering, negativity and constructive destruction in a way 
that can very well be compared to Sabbatian ideals. This would be true even if the 
novel had a different title; the main purpose of this section is to show that and how a 
contemporary piece of literature reveals aspects of the idea of constructive 
destruction.
See below p. 30ff.
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A final word about the tendencies that may be implied in this map. The reader 
may wonder why exclusively Jewish 20*’* century writers are taken into 
consideration, whereas the essay initiates with a discussion of the 19*^* century 
Lutheran writer S0ren Kierkegaard. I do hope that the selection of texts is sensible 
and I assume that these texts could be counted among the most profound comments 
on suffering in the 19*** and 20*** century. However, such a claim begs the question 
why these should be more profound than others. I cannot answer this question 
satisfactorily as yet. The present study is, again, the first pait of a larger project that I 
have commenced with. After the completion of this study, I may feel that the 
selection of texts was premature, or, conversely, I may be able to argue that my 
preference could be defended. For the time being, I cannot but try to show that either 
way the texts that I analyse offer suggestive insights into the nature of suffering and, 
more particularly, into the notion of “constructive destruction” as a strong and 
meaningful response to suffering.
1.4. On the method of inquiry
This reading is primarily not an exercise of systematic theology, for, if it were, the 
definition of terms would have to occupy me to a much greater extent than it does. 
Systematic theology aims to clarify the inner consistency of theological statements^'*, 
and possibly their relation to assumptions that are held both “within” and “outside” 
of theology -  assuming that such a distinction makes any sense in the first place. My 
readings do have implications particularly for theological anthropology and 
harmatiology, which I hope to spell out elsewhere. The method of the following 
work’s approach, in contrast, is closer to a historical method in so far as paiticulai' 
phenomena are interpreted with respect to their historical context. Caiefully, I 
suggest links between these phenomena. Yet I do not present an exhaustive “history 
of the idea of constructive destruction as response to suffering in the modern period”. 
My readings could contribute to such a genealogy; but the formal limits of my 
exercise do not allow me to elaborate the connections between “my” texts in the kind 
of way that would be required would one want to write such a genealogy.
Seen from the perspective of systematic theology and of the history of ideas, the 
following work is preliminaiy. Seen from the perspective of what I would call 
‘differential analogy’, the work may appear to be more free-standing: The overall 
method that I use is that of analogy, more particularly, of the kind of differential 
analogy that John D. Caputo and Thomas Carlson have commented on at some 
length. This differential analogy -  Thomas Carlson speaks of an “apophatic analogy” 
-  assumes that different spheres of thought are related to one another in such a way 
their a) their irreducible diversity is respected, and yet b) they come to illuminate one
Pannenberg (1991), 2 Iff.
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a n o th e r.T h e  analogata are taken from philosophy and the philosophy of religion 
and literature. The following inquiry is therefore not based in any of the three 
disciplines; rather, it encourages indiscretions between them, while maintaining 
awareness for the discretion which must be acknowledged.
Caputo (1997), 189ff.; Carlson (1999), 17; Carlson (2000); Schmidt (2006), 60-63; 74-78; 87-92; 
Martinson’s notion o f a “constellative structure” o f theology takes a very similar approach. See 
Martinson (2000), 332ff.
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2. S0ren Kierkegaard: The sickness of the I and the literary aesthetics of 
redemption
The Danish writer S0ren Kierkegaard is one of the most prominent religious writers 
who have extensively pondered negative phenomena of human existence.^** In what 
follows, I will focus on Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death. This writing will 
give us a vivid account of the character, but also of the shortcomings of 
Kierkegaaid’s discussion of despair.
2.1. Suffering in Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death
The Sickness unto Death offers an analysis of the nature of human despair as well as 
a theological interpretation.^^ I will focus on the former. The actual thesis of the book 
is laid bare in its opening passage. Consequentially, this opening passage is 
extremely condensed, and it is necessai'y to read it carefully.
The text begins:
Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and accordingly can take three forms: in 
despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in the strict since); in despair not to 
will to be oneself, in despair to will to be oneself. (SD 13 = SVj X I127)
Despair is intimately related to self-consciousness, a fact that betrays how deeply 
Kierkegaard is embedded in idealism. Formally speaking, these three forms of 
despair amount to one fundamental form of despair, i.e., a negative relation of the 
self to itself. For not to be conscious of oneself is a negative relation; the same 
applies to the will not be oneself, and ultimately also to that which Kierkegaard calls 
“desperately willing to be oneself’. It is not immediately obvious that this last kind,
In his biography that was recently translated into English, Joakim Garff disapprovingly notes that 
“[pjosterity has very much doted on the Kierkegaard who doted on his melancholia and wrote page 
upon page about his unspeakable sufferings, his vita ante acta [Latin: previous life], the thorn in the 
flesh (Garff (2005), 438) Gaiff reminds us that “[...] Kierkegaard’s unhappiness, his sorrow and 
his despair, also interested him -  and he was rarely so depressed that he did not feel like writing about 
it.” (Garff (2005), 438) G arffs critique does not discourage me. The fact that Kierkegaard 
continuously wrote hardly disputes the fact that he was severely melancholic, for writing is not a sign 
of mental health, (Writing may contribute to mental health, but that is quite a different thing.) I would 
even go so far as to argue that Kierkegaard’s work is split into ironic responses to suffering and other 
responses that are completely void o f irony. “Either/Dr” and ‘T he Repetition” e.g. fall in the former 
category, “Stages on a Lives Way” and his discourse on ‘T he Thorn in the Flesh” in the latter 
(Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses = SV| V 108-123; see below). Kierkegaard was indeed rarely so 
depressed that he did not feel like writing about existential negativity, yet sometimes he does so in a 
kind of way that displays the writer’s ability to step outside of his own experience 
See note 52.
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“desperately willing to be oneself’, is negative, but I think it can be shown that 
Kierkegaard is right in making this assumption: If it is the case that a person 
desperately wills to be him- or herself, then this means that the person implicitly 
acknowledges that he or she is not (properly) him- or herself as yet.
If, then, we can infer from this first sentence of Kierkegaard’s treatise that 
despair is a qualification of the relation of the self to itself, then the next step must be 
to understand how the self-relation of the self is conceived of. Kierkegaard writes
A human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is 
a relation that relates itself to itself or the relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation; the"' 
self is not the relation but is the relation’s relating itself to itself. (SD 13 = SVi X I127)
Kierkegaard’s idealism comes vehemently to a fore as he proposes that spirit was the 
definition of the human being, that is, of the self. The meaning of this sentence is 
somewhat obscured by the equivocation of “relation”. And yet the different nuances 
of “relation” must be held apart in order for the subsequent line of thought to be 
intelligible. In order to clarify the terms, I will from now on index the word 
“relation” as factual relation (relation[factuau) on the one hand and conscious relation 
(relatioii[consdous]) on the other hand.
The self is -  looked at superficially -  a “factual” relation, i.e., the relation that 
the self happens to be, consciously or not.
A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of 
freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between the two. (SD 
13 = SV, X I127)
I will henceforth call this relation “relation[factual]-” Now relation[factuai] is precisely 
not the self.
Considered this way [i.e., as relationjfacwaijli a human being is still not a self. (SD 13 SV, XI 
127)
The true self, again, is spirit and consciousness. We will therefore suspect that the 
true self is a relation that actively and consciously constitutes itself, rather than just 
“being.” With support from the distinction between relation[factuai] and 
relation[conscious], Kierkegaard’s logical cascades become much more accessible.
In the relation[factuaij between the two, the relation[Cactuau is the third as a negative unity, and the 
two relate to the relation[f.,ctuai] and in the relation[factuai] to the relation[factuai]; thus under the 
qualification of the psychical the relationtfactuaii between the psychical and the physical is a 
relation. If, however, the relation[consciousj relates itself to itself, this relation is the positive 
third, and this is the self. (SD 13 = SVi DC 127 -  emphasis mine)
We must quickly rehearse this distinction: a negative relation, relation[factuai], is the 
mere coincidence of something. The self is reIation[factuai] in so far as the self first of 
all happens to be in the world as a composition of two poles. We say that the two 
poles “relate to one another”, but they do so in a kind of way that does not entail any
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action. Their relation is a negative relation with respect to this absence of actuality, 
its “thingness” that simply appals Kierkegaard. On the level of relation f^acmai], the 
poles relate to each other in a kind of way that does not differ from how two cows on 
the meadow or rather two stones on ground “relate” to one another.
The human self, on the contrary, is the (only) relation[conscious] that deserves to be 
called relation[conscious] in a positive sense, a relation[conscious] that is conscious of itself 
as a relation. The human being is the self, relation[conscious] that is raised above the 
state of “thingness” of relationgf^ ctuai] precisely by his or her conscious act of realising
t h a t  /  a m  t h i s  l ela tion [rela tlon[factua l] turning into relation[conscious] in the very moment o f this realisation]•“
(My paraphrase) I will henceforth use a third category term, i.e.
relation[factuai>conscious]. to refer to the relation of the self to itself that constitutes the 
self in the very act of relating to itself.
The key problem of Kierkegaard’s theory is that this reversal or progression of 
relation [factuai>conscious] does not go smoothly: it faces resistance. In the very moment 
of the reversal of relation[factuai] to relation[cQuscious], relation[factuai] is not annihilated, 
and for Kierkegaard, it is not “sublated” [''aufgehobetC] in the way it is for Hegel. 
The Hegelian triplex machinery, thus Kierkegaard, stops precisely because 
relation[conscious] cannot quite get over relktion[factuai]- For it despairs with the simple 
fact that the bold sentence “I am this relation” is followed by a much less enthusiastic 
“That’s the state of affairs that happen to be the case.” The self finds itself to be a 
relation[factuai]» it does not engender it; rather, it has been established.
The human being is [...] a derived, established relation. (SD 13 = SVi 127 XI)
Kierkegaard nowhere explains what allows him to make such an audacious claim, he 
simply takes it for granted, or rather, he derives it from his theology that he smuggles 
into his phenomenology of the self.
If the relation[f.,ctua)>consciousj that relates itself to itself has been established by another, then the 
relation[factuai>conscious] is indeed the third, but this relation[factuai>consciousi, the third, is yet again a 
relation and relates itself to that which established the entire relation^ facmaij [and aho
re la t io n [ fa c tu a l> c o n sc io u s ]]  •
The human self is such a derived, established relation[factuai>consciou,s]. a 
relation[factuai>conscious] that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to 
another. (SD 13f. =SV, XI 127f.)
The slight embarrassment that my system betrays as I added “[and also 
relation[factuai>conscious]]” to “relation[factuai]” in this quotation can be seen as the 
decisive hint to the essential dilemma described in The Sickness unto Death. The 
“other power” that has established the relation has not only established the 
relation[factuai]> but also the relation[factuai>consdous]. Precisely in the moment where the
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self may see itself at the very peak of its autonomy, it must acknowledge^^ that 
everything, the state of affairs and the realisation of the state of affairs performed by 
the allegedly spontaneous self that proclaims ‘7 am a relation,” are in fact both 
established by another power. For, again, the self \\ias found  itself to be relating itself 
to itself. This preceding facticity is the catastrophe of the autonomous spirit, the 
experience that in the midst of the joyful exclamation ‘7 am a relation,” the I is not 
really acting, because it never had an alternative. The self does not become a relation 
by exclaiming that it is one; rather the self closes ranks with itself by stating what is 
the case.
This is the reason why there can be three rather than two forms of despair.
This is why there can be two forms of despair in the strict sense. If a human being had itself 
established itself, then there could be only one form: not to will to be oneself, to will to do 
away with oneself, but there could not be the form: in despair to want to be oneself. (SD 14 = 
SVi X I128)
Kierkegaard is speaking in the irrealis', the human being has not established itself, 
and there is therefore a third form of despair. If the self had established itself, then at 
least it could get rid of itself by dying, and yet precisely because it has been 
established by another power, it will act in relation to that other power no matter 
what it does, and by acting in relation to another, it will continue to be a self. 
Therefore, it can not stop relating to the over power, which entails that the self 
cannot stop being a self, consequentially, it can never die.^^
This second formulation [in despair to will to be oneself] is specifically the expression for 
the complete dependence of the relation (of the self), the expression for the inability of the 
self to arrive at or to be in equilibrium and rest by itself, but only, in relating itself to itself, 
by relating itself to that which has established the entire relation. Yes, this second form of 
despair (in despair to will to be oneself) is so far from designating merely a distinctive kind 
of despair that, on the contrary, all despair ultimately can be traced back to and be resolved 
in it. If the despairing person is aware of his despair, as he thinks he is, and does not speak 
meaninglessly of it as of something that is happening to him (somewhat as one suffering 
from dizziness speaks in nervous delusion of a weight on his head or of something that has
Assuming that the prerequisite “The human being is [ ...]  a derived, established relation” (SD 13 = 
SVi 127 XI) can be sustained.
This is also the reason why Kierkegaard writes in the preface: “Just one more comment, no doubt 
unnecessary, but nevertheless I will make it: once and for all may I point out that in the whole book, 
as the title indeed declares, despair is interpreted as a sickness, not as a cure. Despair is indeed that 
dialectical.” (SD 6 = SV; XI 118) Dying is not an option: “Literally speaking, there is not the slightest 
possibility that anyone will die from this sickness or that it will end in physical death. On the contrary, 
the torment o f despair is precisely the inability to die. [ ...]  When the danger is so great that death 
becomes the hope, then despair is the hopelessness of not even being able to die.” (SD 17f. = SV; XI 
13If.) “The person in despair cannot die [...] [I]t is precisely over this that he despairs (not as having 
despaired); that he cannot consume himself, cannot get rid o f himself, cannot reduce himself to 
nothing.” (SD 18f. =  SV; XI 132) I am awaie that Kierkegaard derives the impossibility o f death from 
the phenomenon o f despair, not from the definition o f the self. By doing the latter, I am reading 
Kierkegaard against the grain, thus foreshadowing my appropriation o f Adorno’s interpretation of 
Kierkegaard, which does the same. On Adorno’s comment on “the dying o f  the s e lf ’, see below p. 
32ff.
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fallen down on him, etc., a weight and a pressure that nevertheless are not something 
external but a reverse reflection of the internal)'*® and now with all his power seeks to break 
the despair by himself and by himself alone -  he is still in despair and with all his presumed 
effort only works himself all the deeper into despair. (SD 14 = SV; X I128)
Despair is thus the inevitable consequence of the constitution of the self: The self 
realises that its allegedly self-constitutive action, the realisation of itself as a 
relation[factuai>conscious], is essentially not the self’s own action. Thus, a battle against 
the lack of autonomy of the self is triggered; it is a battle that “either intensifies the 
despair in a still higher form or leads to faith.”'** The only alternative to despair is. 
that the self were to humble itself*^, that it be broken'*^ and lost'*'*; then despair is a 
thoroughfare to faith.'*  ^ Faith is the opposite to despair in so fai' as the faithful self 
relates to itself (as constituted as a unity of opposites by God) without despair and 
“rests transparently” in God.
The main point here is simply that the definition [of sin as despair before God], like a net, 
embraces all forms. And this it does, as can be seen if it is tested by posing its opposite: 
faith, by which I steer in this whole book as by a trustworthy navigation guide [spmærke]. 
Faith is: that the self in being itself and in willing to be itself rests transparently in God. (SD 
82 = SV iX I 194)'*'*
Thus far we have understood the concept of despair and its relation to the self; 
we must now relate “despair” to suffering in order to appreciate the contribution that 
Kierkegaard makes to the theme of this essay.'*  ^ The relation between suffering and 
despair mirrors the dichotomy that we have described in the usage of the concept 
“relation” on a different level.
Kierkegaaid uses the term “suffering” both in a derogatory and in an affirmative 
tone. This equivocation corresponds to the distinction between a kind of suffering 
that is caused externally, “historical” suffering so to speak, which is a sign of being 
“fallen” to the world. We could call this suffering “suffering[extemai].” According to 
Kierkegaard, the understanding of “suffering” as something externally engendered is
This remark that Kierkegaard makes in the third addition printed in brackets provides the link 
between this introductory reflection on despair and the closer inspection o f Kierkegaard’s evaluation 
of different forms o f negative experiences: negative experienees, thus the consequence of 
Kierkegaard’s excessive idealism, are misunderstood so long as the self blames an external cause, 
rather than internally appropriating the experience with a conscious act. The distinction between 
relationffaeiuj,!] and relationfconscious] will be mirrored by a distinction between suffering[gx,cmi,H and 
suffering[inten)ai] (see below p. 15ff.).
SD 60 = SV; XI 171.
SD 61 = SV; XI 173; SD 70 = SV; XI 180f.; SD 78 = SV, XI 190; SD 86 = SV, XI 197.
'*®SD 6 5 = S V ; X I 177.
'*‘*SD 67 = SV; XI 178.
SD 67 = SV; X I 178.
I will comment on the particular words o f this passage later on (see below p. 20ff.). See the more 
extensive (dogmatic) version o f this definition: “[S]in is -  after being taught by a revelation from God 
what sin is -  before God in despair not to will to be oneself or in despair to will to be oneself.” (SD 96
= SV, XI 207; see also SD 30 = SV, XI 143; SD 131 = SV, X I241).
It is worth noting that Hermann H esse’s “Steppenwolf’ also draws this distinction: “T don’t
despair. As to suffering -  oh, yes, I know all about that!” (Hesse (2001), 148)
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plainly a misunderstanding. In contrast, the kind of suffering that is taking place in 
inwardness, genuine suffering, links the human being to God. The internal suffering 
could be called “suffermg[intemaij”- This suffering[intemaij could be seen as the true 
suffering in so far as Climacus says “suffering is precisely inwardness”'*®,
Suffering[extemai] is then quite distinct from despair; it amounts to a vulgar and 
incomplete stage that at best precedes despair, i.e., “despair not to be conscious of 
having a se lf’'*^ . Suffering[intemai] is the state where the individual has become 
conscious of the fact that it is him or her that is actively (one could almost say: 
spontaneously) suffering, and not suffering that befalls him or her. If we were to- 
imagine a scene that portrays this distinction, we could say that suffering[exiemai] 
would be expressed by the exclamation of a suffering person: “I suffer", whereas 
suffering[isuemai] transforms this to the exclamation: “/  suffer.” Suffering[iniemai] 
correlates to ‘authentic’, i.e., “conscious” despair.^® Authentic despair is the suffering 
of the self that has become aware of his or her suffering as her conscious acf^*, 
which, in relation to God, is an act of rebellion, just like the consciously desperate 
self rebels against God who undermines its autonomy, as we have seen above. The 
rebellious nature of despair (and this would also apply to conscious suffering) is 
beautifully portrayed in an image at the end of the first part^^ of “The Sickness unto 
Death”. The self, Kierkegaard points out, wants to hold its own malfunction against 
the other power that constituted the self; this is the last possible upheaval of the 
autonomous I against a creator who limits the autonomy of the I.
Figuratively speaking, it is an enor slipped into an author’s writing and the error became 
conscious of itself as an error -  perhaps it actually was not a mistake but in a much higher 
sense an essential part of the whole production -  and now this error wants to mutiny against 
the author, out of hatred against him, forbidding him to correct it and in manicial defiance 
saying to him: No, I refuse to be erased; I will stand as a witness against you, a witness that 
you are a second-rate author. (SD 74 = SV, X I185)
CUP 288 = SVi V II247.
SD 13 = SV, X I 127
As opposed to the ‘improper’ or ‘inauthentic’ despair’, i.e., “not despair in the strict sense” (SD 13 
= SV, XI 127).
“Christianly understood, then, not death is 'the sickness unto death’; not even less so is everything 
that goes under the name o f earthly temporal sufferings; need, illness, misery, haidship, adversities, 
torments, mental sufferings, cares, grief. And even if such things were so hard and painful that we 
human beings or at least the sufferer, would declare ‘This is worse than death’ -  all those things, 
which, although not sickness, can be compaied with sickness, are still, Christianly understood, not the 
sickness unto death.” (SD 8 -  SV, XI 122) See also SD 67 = SV, XI 179: “[Despair] does not come 
from the outside as a suffering under the pressures o f externalities but comes directly from the self” 
and SD 99 = SV, XI 210: “Both manifestations [of sin] jointly indicate that despair does not come 
from the outside but from within.” -  This distinction is mirrored in Kierkegaard’s distinction between 
the sufferings o f Paul the Apostle that “are only in the external world” and that which he himself calls 
his “thorn in the flesh”, which is a heavenly reminder (Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses 333 = SV, V 
111).
The first part o f the “Sickness Unto Death” (“The sickness unto death is despair”) is a 
phenomenological analysis, whereas the second part (“Despair is sin”) inscribes this analysis in 
Christian harmatiology. I do not dwell on this distinction, because it is subverted by the book itself: 
The first section of the book relies on dogmatic assumptions, as I have indicated, and the second part 
still relies on phenomenological means of inquiry. Neither section is purely one or the other.
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Suffering and despair are spiritualised in Kierkegaard’s account. It is 
worthwhile to dwell on this observation a little longer, for Adorno’s reading of 
Kierkegaard, to which we will turn soon, consists to a large part of a (dialectically 
constructive) criticism of Kerkegaard’s spiritualising philosophy. Kierkegaard 
points out that despair is a “qualification of the spirit” ®^ and its extent is directly 
proportional to the extent of consciousness.^'* Despair, furthermore, is stronger than 
the desire to be freed from suffering[extemai]- The person who desperately does not 
want to be himself or herself would rather suffer than accept the help of a “‘Helper’ 
for whom all things are possible”, and on whom he or she would become dependent 
if His help were to be accep ted .T h e  external aspect of suffering can then be but a 
sign for the internal suffering; therein lies the only benefit and legitimisation of 
suffering[extemai]- The God-relationship is eternal, just like despair as an inevitable 
consequence of an ill relation of the self to itself (as a unity of opposites^^) and to 
God cannot ever end^^ -  except, as we have seen, for faith: Despair never devours 
itself, the only way for despair to end is that one would surrender oneself to God. 
This account for despair may appear to be problematic. I will, however, try to show 
that the aesthetics of Kerkegaai'd’s late writings casts a much brighter light on his 
response to suffering.
2.2. Pseudonymity and the Seamark
Thus far, I have been attributing The Sickness unto Death to Spren Kierkegaard. This 
is slightly aberrant in so far as the book was published pseudonymously, i.e., under 
the pseudonym Anti-Climacus. Pseudonymity is a very basic kind of literary fiction. 
More particulai'ly, pseudonymity is a device that can turn a text into fiction, though 
the text my initially have appeared to be non-fictional. Precisely this is the case with 
The Sickness unto Death. In order to understand the meaning that the pseudonymity
SD 24 = SV] XI 138. Consequentially, Anti-Climacus later on states that “[...]  sin is specifically a 
qualification of the spirit.” (SD 81 = SV, XI 193) In line with these assumptions, Climacus had 
asserted that “Christianity is spirit, spirit is inwardness, inwai'dness is subjectivity, and at its maximum 
an infinite, interested passion for one’s eternal happiness.” (CUP 33 = SV, VII 21)
The ever increasing intensity of despair depends on the degree o f consciousness or is proportionate 
to its increase; the greater the degree o f consciousness, the more intensive the despair. (SD 42 = SV, 
XI 154). The character of despair as act becomes particularly evident as even the form o f despair that 
is (only seemingly inconsequentially) related to suffering is despair precisely via the conscious act 
(see also SD 62 = SV, XI 174) in which the self relates to the externally caused suffering, is a “despair 
in weakness, a suffering o f the self; but with the aid o f the relative reflection that he has, he attempts 
to sustain his self, and this constitutes another difference from the purely immediate man.” (SD 54 = 
SV, X I 167)
SD 71 = SV, IX 182; see also SD 77 = SV, XI 190: “[The poet-existence] would like very much to 
be himself before God, but with the exclusion of the fixed point where the self suffers; there in despair 
he does not will to be himself).”
“A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, o f the temporal and the eternal, of 
freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis.” (SD 13 = SV, XI 127)
Despair is “perpetually to be dying, to die and yet not to die, to die death.” (SD 18 = SV, XI 132)
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imposes on the phenomenological treatise The Sickness unto Death, we must first of 
all acquaint ourselves with the pseudonym “Anti-Climacus.”
The majority of Kierkegaard’s journal entries regarding Anti-Climacus present 
the pseudonym Anti-Climacus as a sort of “God’s terrorist” who forces his listeners 
down on their knees: Anti-Climacus reminds the hearers that being a disciple should 
not be taken too lightly^®; Kierkegaard likens him to (the voice of) a judge, who also 
judges him, Kierkegaard^^; a voice that, though its demands are impossible to fulfil, 
“must at least be heaid.” ®^ It is a voice that calls to a halt^* and that fulfils 
Kierkegaard’s own task, which is “continually to jack up the price.”^^  When 
Kierkegaard thought of the pseudonym Anti-Climacus for the first time, he was 
considering a pseudonym that should be “recklessly ironical and humorous”®®. In a 
letter to Rasmus Nielsen, Kierkegaard dwells particularly on the prefix of the name 
“Anti-Climacus.” Again, Anti-Climacus is described as someone who performs an 
attack.
I am sending you a new book. Presumably you will have no difficulty in discovering why 
this pseudonym is called Anri’-Climacus, in which respect he is quite different from Johannes 
Climacus, with whom he certainly does have something in common (as they do also share 
parts of a name), but from whom he differs very essentially in that J. Cl. humorously denies 
that he himself is Christian and, in consequence, can only make indirect attacks, and, in 
consequence, as a humorist must take it all back -  while Anti-Climacus is very far from 
denying that he himself is a Christian, which is evident in the d ire c t a ttack . [Emphasis 
mine]®'*
And yet, as I already mentioned, there are also journal entries that suggest that the 
function of the pseudonym Anti-Climacus is far more complex.
JP 695 = Pap. X3 A 653,
JP 6442 = Pap. X , A 536. Kierkegaard sees himself as situated below his pseudonym Anti- 
Climacus, and yet above the pseudonym Climacus: “Just as the Guadalquibir River (this occurred to 
me earlier and is somewhere in the journal [i.e., IX A 422]) plunges down somewhere into the earth, 
so is there also a stretch, the upbuilding, which carries my name, There is something (the esthetic) 
which is lower and is pseudonymous and something which is higher and is also pseudonymous, 
because as a person I do not correspond to it. The pseudonym is Johannes Anticlimacus in contrast to 
Climacus, who said he was not a Christian. Anticlimacus is the opposite extreme: a Christian on an 
extraordinary level -  but I m yself manage to be only a very simple Christian.” (JP 6431 = Pap. X| A 
510) See also JP 6433 = Pap. X | A 517: “Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus have several things 
in common, but the difference is that whereas Johannes Climacus places him self so low that he even 
says o f him self that he is not a Christian, one seems to be able to detect in Anti-Climacus that he 
regards himself to be a Christian on an extraordinarily high level [in margin: see p. 260, p. 267 (i.e. X, 
A 530, 536)1, at times he also seems to believe that Christianity really is only for geniuses, using the 
word in a non-intellectual sense. His personal guilt, then, is to confuse himself with ideality (this is the 
demonic in him), but his portrayal of ideality can be absolutely sound, and I bow to it. I would place 
myself higher than Johannes Climacus, lower than Anti-Climacus.”
JP 6445 = Pap. X , A 546.
JP 6450 = Pap. X, A 557; JP 6461 = Pap. X, A 593; JP 6518 = Pap. X; A 17; JP 6530 = Pap. X; A 
192;P V 6 = SVi X III495.
®^JP 6464 = Pap. X, A 615 .
®®JP 6141 = Pap. IX A 9.
JP 6434; Letters No. 213 [July, 1849].
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This can best be ascribed to Anti-Climacus.
I gladly undertake, by way of a brief repetition, to emphasize what other pseudonyms 
have emphasized. The absurd is not he absurd or absurdities without any distinction 
(wherefore Johannes de Silentio; “How many of our age understand what the absurd is?”). 
The absurd is a category, and the most developed form is required to define the Christian 
absurd accurately and with conceptual correctness. The absurd is a category, the negative 
criterion, of the divine or of the relationship to the divine. When the believer has faith, the 
absurd is not the absurd -  faith transforms it, but faith is not faith in the strictest sense, but a 
kind of knowledge. The absurd terminates negatively before the sphere of faith, which is a 
sphere by itself. To a third person the believer relates himself by virtue of the absurd; so 
must a third person judge, for a third person does not have the passion of faith. Johannes de 
Silentio has never claimed to be a believer; just the opposite, he has explained that he is not a ‘ 
believer -  in order to illuminate faith negatively. (JP 10 = Pap. B 79 [1850])®^
Just how this strategy of ‘negative illumination’^^  is associated with Kierkegaard will 
be explored more thoroughly with reference to an extensive entry where Kierkegaard 
comments on the relationship between the pseudonym Anti-Climacus and his 
precedent, Climacus. Kierkegaard describes Anti-Climacus, the Christian to an 
extraordinary degree, as the higher pseudonym, while he sees Climacus as the lower 
pseudonym. I will have a closer look at one of the texts were Kierkegaard expresses 
this view.
The fictional chaiacter of the pseudonyms implies that the pseudonyms are unable to 
reflect on themselves or to look at their own work self-critically; they are confined to 
the position that they represent. Yet this confinement is beneficial for the reader, 
which will become clear in an entry that is itself attributed to Anti-Climacus. It 
begins with words that appeal' to connect to the preface of the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript of Johannes Climacus^^, and it continues by pointing out the
Kierkegaard also draws a connection between Johannes de Silentio and Johannes Climacus in a 
later (somewhat obscure) passage (JP 6600 = Pap Xg B 82).
I have tried to show elsewhere that ‘negative illumination’ can also be attributed to Kierkegaard’s 
early pseudonymous writings (Schmidt (2006), 130.133.182f.).
JP 6439 = Pap. Xi A 530.
“I, Johannes Climacus, born and bred in this city and now thirty years old, an ordinary human being 
like most folk, assume that the highest good, called an eternal happiness, awaits me just as it awaits a 
housemaid and a professor. I have heard that Christianity is one’s prerequisite for this good. I now ask 
how I may enter to this doctrine. [...] How can I, Johannes Climacus, share in the happiness that
[in margin: A passage in the preface to the book The Sickness unto Death.] To the closing 
passage, “but that the form is what it is”, I have thought of adding: apart from the fact that it |
is also rooted in my being who I am. But this would be going too far in transforming a 
fictitious character into actuality; a fictitious character has no possibility other than the one 
he has; he cannot declare that he could also speak in another way and yet be the same; he has 
no identity which encompasses many possibilities. On the other hand, the fact that he says:
“it is at least well considered” -  is proper, for it may very well be that, although it is only 
form. For him to say: “It is psychologically correct” is a double blow, for it is also 
psychologically correct with respect to Anti-Climacus. Climacus is lower, denies he is a 
Christian. Anti-Climacus is higher, a Christian on an extraordinarily high level. With 
Climacus everything drowns in humor; therefore he himself retracts the book. Anti-Climacus 
is thetical.^’
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well known contrast between the sceptic Climacus and the Christian Anti-Climacus. 
They are parasitical on one another as the one says what he says “simply in spite o f ’ 
the o th e r.T h is  controversial relationship is then framed in a vivid picture:
For we are related to each other, but we are not twins, we are opposites. Between us there is 
a deep, a fundamental relationship, but despite the most desperate efforts we never get any 
farther, any closer, than to a repelling contact. There is a point and an instant at which we 
touch, but at the same instant we fly from each other with the speed of infinity. Like two 
eagles plunging from a mountain top toward a point, or like an eagle plunging from the top 
of a cliff and a predatoi-y fish shooting from the ocean’s depth to the surface there is a. 
contact, and at the same instant we rush from each other, each to its extremity.
The point we are seeking is this: simply and plainly to be a genuine Christian.™ There is 
a contact, but at the same time we fly from each other: Johannes says he is not a Christian, 
and I say that I am an extraordinary Christian such as there has never been, but please note, 
in hidden inwardness.
If it should happen sometime that we switched identities at the instant of contact, so that 
I would say of myself what Johannes says of himself and conversely, it would make no 
difference. Just one thing is impossible -  that we both say the same thing about ourselves; on 
the other hand it is possible that we both could vanish. (JP 6349 = Pap. B 48)
The concluding paragraph of this entry is of particular impact in so far as it 
emphasises the aesthetic function of the pseudonymous cast of the writings.
Actually, we do not exist, but he who does come to be simply and plainly a genuine 
Christian will be able to speak of us as two brothers -  opposites -  just as the sailor speaks of 
the twins by which he steers. Just as the sailor tells about the fantastic things he has seen, so 
also the person who has come to be simply and plainly a Christian will be able to tell about 
the fantastic things he has seen. Perhaps there are lies in what the sailor tells -  this will not 
be true of what the genuine Christian tells us, for it is true that we two brothers are fantastic 
figures, but it is also true that he has seen us. (JP 6349 = Pap. X^  B 48)
The motif of a nautical mark is also used in a crucial passage of The Sickness unto 
Death’.
The main point here is simply that the definition [of sin as despair before God], like a net, 
embraces all forms. And this it does, as can be seen if it is tested by posing its opposite:
Christianity promises?” (CUP 15ff. = SV, VÏI 7ff) “I, Anticlimacus, who wrote this little book (a 
poor, simple, mere man just like most everybody else) was born in Copenhagen and am just about, 
yes, exactly, the same age as Johannes Climacus, with whom I in one sense have very much, have 
everything in common, but from whom in another sense I am utterly different. He explicitly says of 
himself that he is not a Christian; this is infuriating. I, too, have been so infuriated about it that I -  if 
anyone could somehow trick me into saying it -  say just the opposite, or because I say just the 
opposite about m yself Ï could become furious about what he says of himself. I say, in fact, that I am 
an extraordinary Christian such as there has never been, but, please note, not one, detects anything, 
even the slightest, but profess I can, and I can profess (but I cannot really profess, for then, after all, I 
would violate the secret’s hiding-place) that in hidden inwardness I am, as I said, an extraordinary 
Christian such as there has never been.” (JP 6349 = Pap. X@ B 48)
The reader, who in addition to being my friend is also a friend of understanding, will also readily 
perceive that, despite my extraordinary Christianity, there is something malevolent in me. For it is 
sufficiently clear that I have taken this position simply out o f spite against Johannes. Had I come first, 
I would have said o f m yself what he now says o f himself and then he would have been compelled to 
say o f me what I say o f him.” (JP 6349 = Pap. Xf, B 48)
™ See above note 68.
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faith, by which I steer in this whole book as by a trustworthy navigation guide [s0mærke]. 
Faith is; that the self in being itself and in willing to be itself rests transparently in G odf
The metaphor of “steering” deserves our full attention. Both the function of the 
fictional characters of Kierkegaard’s later works and the “centre” of The Sickness 
unto Death are associated with the nautical metaphor of steering a vessel with the 
help of a point of orientation.
There is no doubt that our age and Protestantism especially may need the monastery again or 
that it should exist. “The monastery” is an essentially dialectical element in Christianity;- 
therefore we need to have it out there like a buoy [spmærke] in order to see where we are, 
even though I myself would not enter it. (JP 2750 = Pap. VIIIA 403 [1847])
In order to understand the meaning of the word “spmærke” in The Sickness unto 
Death and what this word tells us about Kierkegaard’s literary strategy, we will first 
take into account all passages where Kierkegaard uses this word,^^ Kierkegaard uses 
the word “spmærke” in a very similar sense as he refers to the monastery: A 
“s0mærke” is a point that provides orientation about one’s own standpoint or 
location precisely by remaining distant from the observer. The monastery, that is, its 
harshness, indicates to Christianity its own lack of seriousness. Although 
Kierkegaard would not enter the monastery -  because it falls under the verdict of 
what he calls “external” -  he acknowledges that it does have a heuristic function; 
Kierkegaard does not find it preferable to enter the monastery, but the mere fact that 
Christianity is unfit to enter (regardless of the actual meaning that entering the 
monastery may or may not have) unmasks Christianity.^^
The aspect of distance is also emphasised in a footnote to Kierkegaard’s Point o f 
View on my Work as an Author:
The significance of this little book’"^ (which does not stand in the authorship as much as it 
relates totally to the authorship and for that reason also was anonymous, in order to be kept 
outside entirely) is not very easy to explain without going into the whole matter. It is like a 
navigation mark [spmærke] by which one steers but, note well, in such a way that the pilot 
understands precisely that he is to keep a distance from it. (PV 6 = SV, XIII495)
At another instance, Kierkegaard, that is, Anti-Climacus, points out that one can only 
approach a seamark in such a way that one keeps a distance.^^
The metaphor of the seamark finally provides a link that neatly expresses 
Kierkegaard’s anthropology in relation to his Christology. In his “Practice in 
Christianity” Anti-Climacus writes:
SD 82 = SV| X I 194. 
See McKinnon (1973).
In positive terms, this means that Christians ought to be fit to enter a monastery, even though for 
other reasons, to actually do so, again, would be a misunderstanding.
Kierkegaard is speaking about a text that he published pseudonymously.SViXIII 495.
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§1The God-man is a sign
What is meant by a sigrfl A sign is the denied immediacy or the second being that is 
different from the first being. This is not to say that the sign is not immediately something 
but that it is a sign, and it is not immediately that which it is as a sign or as a sign it is not the 
immediate that it is. A navigation maik [s0mærke] is a sign. Immediately it certainly is 
something, a post, a lamp, etc., but a sign is not the immediate that it is. (PC 124 = SV, XII 
116)™
These semiotic deliberations may appear to be rather elementary. It is important, 
however, that for Kierkegaard the “spmærke” appears to be the prime example for 
the differential nature that all signs share. At this instance, Kierkegaard is referring to 
the semiotic difference between the signifié and the signifiant, yet he then proceeds 
to interpret this semiotic cogitation Christologically. Anti-Climacus then points out 
that Christ the God-man is a “sign of contradiction.”
A sign of contradiction is a sign that intrinsically contains a contradiction in itself. [...] In 
Scripture the God-man is called a sign of contradiction. [...] [T]he contradiction is between 
being God and being an individual human being. (PC 124f. = SV, XII 117f.)
If we recall the definition of faith in the Sickness unto Death, it becomes clear that 
the God-man and the complexity of its signification are tightly connected to faith in 
God: The self of the human beings mirrors the duality of the God-man, as the self, 
too, is a synthesis of two contradictory poles. From this perspective, it is clear why 
faith and the God-man are both designated as “s0mærker”. Faith and the God-man 
have in common that they are both syntheses that man cannot “figure out.” To 
believe: to relate to oneself to, i.e., to the synthesis that the self is, without despair 
and thus to ground oneself transparently in God, is impossible in the very same sense 
in which it is impossible to conceive of the God-man. Phenomenology and theology 
meet from different angels. This impossibility is the reason for the complex structure 
of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings, which I will now summarise in view of the 
question of suffering.
Aesthetically, The Sickness unto Death depends on entities that guide thinking 
and yet “are” not: The aesthetic praxis of reading these texts can create a Christian, 
who in retrospect will say that he has been impacted by the author Anti-Climacus, 
i.e., that the guidance that he received was a true guidance (“Guidance”). The same 
applies to the notion of “faith” in the Sickness unto Death, which is a seamark in the 
sense explored above: Faith in the sense that Kierkegaai'd envisions is unattainable 
for human conceptualisation and ungraspable for language, and this is why it can be 
said of Anti-Climacus that he illuminates faith only n e g a t i ve l y T h e  negativity of 
the “s0mærke” -  the fact that one must keep at a distance from it -  brings forth the 
text, it does provide orientation for language and praxis, though the meaning can
™ See Patti son (1992), 89. 
See above p. 19.
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only be understood in retrospect, by those who have arrived at (or more precisely; 
who have been ushered to) the goal.
The structure of the late Kierkegaard’s pseudonymity is an extremely vibrant 
example of an indirect discourse, highly sophisticated and yet utterly teleological.^^ 
The content of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymity, the underlying assumption about 
despair, is highly problematic: Kierkegaard did not envisage an account for the 
surmounting of suffering; the very idea is alien to him. But he did (unwillingly) 
provide a structure for the discourse about this very surmounting, for the discourse 
about suffering may be confronted with the very same problem as is the case with the 
discourse about faith; The surmounting of suffering is ultimately unavailable, and yet 
it does occur, and it must be thought of and talked of in such a way that its necessity 
and its unavailability are both taken into account.^^
2.3. Kierkegaard’s reversals
In conclusion, Kierkegaard’s theory of suffering is cynical, for it disrespects the 
concrete suffering of earthly beings and installs an aristocracy of the highly reflective 
and self-conscious individuals who stand out from the vast majority of persons who 
erringly think they are struggling with the external world, whereas it is really 
themselves and their creator with whom everything that is of any impact is 
concerned.
Kierkegaard’s account of suffering falls short. It falls short of true healing. 
Strictly speaking, there are two reversals at work in Kierkegaai'd’s thought: The 
reversal from unconscious suffering[extemai] to conscious sufferingpatemai] and the 
reversal from the latter to faith. The reversal of suffering to faith may be much more 
interesting for a theory on the overcoming of suffering, yet unfortunately, 
Kierkegaard is of little help here. Faith, we rehearse, is the opposite of despair, but 
there is for Kierkegaard such a thing as suffering beyond despair; faith and suffering 
can coincide, even though faith and despair can not. We are then left with the first 
reversal, the reversal from unconscious despair respectively suffering[externai], to 
conscious despair respectively sufferingtintemai], from the “I suffer"' to the ‘7 suffer.” "^ 
Kierkegaard’s distinction between authentic and inauthentic despair is a prime 
example of existentialist arrogance, and for the suffering individual it is of little help 
to become conscious.
Kierkegaard’s philosophical and theological presuppositions are indeed hard to 
sustain: Theologically, Kierkegaard embraces a Lutheran paradox that faith be all 
that is demanded from the human being, whereas it is terribly hard if not impossible 
for the human being ever to “attain” faith. The desperate self cannot but move ever
™ For the denial of the distinct teleology of the indirect communication, see Poole fl993). 
™ See Schmidt (2005).
This ties with the assessor’s recommendation that the aesthete was to choose his despair.
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more deeply into despair. As a consequence, the self can only humble him- or herself 
under God: “[...] for God everything is possible.”^^
Should we then dispense with Kierkegaard’s writings and not read them any 
longer? Yes and no. We should read them, but, if necessary, dispense with them (i.e., 
with particular propositions that are unsustainable) in the course of reading. Adorno 
has taught us how to do this.
SD 38 = S.V. XIX 150; SD 39 = S.V. XIX 151
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3. Adorno’s reading of Kierkegaard: Constructive destruction
3.1. Interlude: Christian and Jewish versions of “reversal”
Kierkegaard’s theory of the self has many deficits. I have emphasised particularly 
what could be called the “spiritualisation” of the self. This shortcoming of 
Kerkegaai'd’s theory may reflect a shortcoming that was typical for the philosophy 
of his age as a whole. Yet what does this mean for the evaluation of Kerkegaai'd’s 
works? Theodor W. Adorno has argued extensively that the deficits of Kerkegaard’s 
theory lay bare the deficits of his age, but at they same time, the collapse of 
Kerkegaai'd’s system leaves behind what one could call ‘fragments of redemption’ 
We will now turn to several versions of such a reversal that searches for hope in the 
midst of a catastrophe.
As I have already mentioned, the texts in this essay that date from the 20‘*' 
century are all Jewish. At this point, I wish to make one more comment on this fact. 
The reversal of the negative into the positive that Kierkegaai’d had in mind is a 
genuinely Lutheran notion. Lutheran existential dialectics consists of reversals from 
sin to grace, from desperation to faith.®  ^ I will shortly comment on the question why 
the Lutheran versions of this idea may impact us less than the corresponding Jewish 
“versions” do.
In John Updike’s fiction, we find resonances of this (and other) Lutheran 
trope(s). In the famous Rabbit-sage, we read about the protagonist Harry Angstrom 
alias Rabbit:
Harry has no taste for the daik, tangled, visceral aspect of Christianity, the going 
through quality of it, the passage into death and suffering that redeems and inverts these 
things, like an umbrella blown inside out. He lacks the mindful will to walk the straight line 
of a paradox. His eyes turn toward the light however it catches his retinas.®'^
Why is it that Harry Angstrom cannot relate to the Lutheran and Kierkegaardian idea 
of reversal? To some extent, this question needs to be addressed within the context of 
the plot of the Rabbit-tetralogy.®^ And yet the question remains to be asked whether 
there are intrinsic features to the Christian notion of reversal that cause them to be 
less transmissible than the corresponding elements of Jewish thought. In what 
follows, I will offer a somewhat vast speculation. The word “paradox” may provide a 
clue. In Jewish thought, the relationship between negativity and positivity is
I am alluding to Susan Handelman’s book Fragments o f  Redemption  (1991). The title of 
Handelman’s book about Scholem, Benjamin and Levinas neatly summarises a concept that Adorno, 
who was strongly influenced by Benjamin, adopted.
See above note 32.
Updike (1995), 203. For even more obviously Lutheran theorems in the Rabbit-saga, see. e.g. the 
following remark: 'That's why we love disaster, Harry sees, it puts us back in touch with guilt and sends 
us crawling back to God.” (Updike (1995), 933)
See Schmidt (2006b).
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embedded in the narratives of exile and in the idea of the messianic.®^ These more 
extensive contexts may make the Jewish discourses of reversal more accessible and 
transmutable than the subjectivist Lutheran version of the reversal.
3.2. Kierkegaard’s failure
In his habilitation-thesis on Kierkegaard®^, Adorno reads Kierkegaard against the 
grain.®® Adorno’s intentional unfaithfulness to Kierkegaard’s intention has a twofold. 
motivation: According to Adorno, Kierkegaard a) was trapped in his times; b) by the 
strength of constructing a philosophical theory that falls apart due to the 
shortcomings of his age, Kierkegaard’s writings perform the most efficient critique 
of his times that one could imagine, and they instantiate the only sincere illumination 
of redemption that is imaginable in the face of the conditions that he is subjected to. 
Adorno thus sees Kierkegaard’s work as a productive failure. What we find here is 
the very logic of reversal that we have been observing in several different guises.®  ^
We will try to understand Kierkegaard’s failure, and then see how Adorno reads it in 
a productive kind of way; finally, I will reflect on the overall impact that Adorno’s 
habilitation thesis may have on this study.
According to Adorno, reading Kierkegaard against the grain means to resist the 
allure of his poetry. One should, Adorno argues, never give in to Kierkegaard’s lure. 
Instead, one must always view his words from a perspective other than the one that 
the context of his work provides; “every insight into Kierkegaard is to be wrung out 
of his own context.” (KKA 13)
Even with the respect to an ultimate convergence of art and philosophy, all attempts so 
aesthetize philosophical method are to be rebuffed. On the contrary, the more exclusively 
philosophical form is ciystallized as such, the more firmly it excludes all metaphor that
Particularly the idea o f the “messianic” has been readily adopted in Jewish thought in the 20'*’ 
century not only by Adorno, but also by Ernst Bloch, Gershom Scholem and Walter Benjamin. 
Benjamin e.g. has commented on the desirability o f the downfall of the world (see Benjamin (1977), 
262f.); Benjamin also developed a notion o f the reversal of melancholy into redemption (see Bock
(2000), 29).
Adorno’s habilitation-thesis was supervised by Paul Tillich.
*** It may be worth noting the Michael Theunissen, one of the key negativist thinkers in continental 
20'*’ century philosophy, also reads Kierkegaard against the grain, i.e., against his explicit intention 
(Theunissen (2005), viff.). At first sight, Theunissen appears to endeavour a project similar to that of 
Adorno, for Theunissen, like Adorno, wants to keep philosophy and literature apait (Theunissen 
(2005), viii; see above p. 18) But upon closer inspection it turns out that Theunissen’s and Adorno’s 
readings are moving into opposite directions. Adorno finds the true content in the metaphor, though 
what allows him to do this is that he reads the metaphors against their initial intention. Theunissen 
simply dismisses the poetic and the aesthetic altogether and interprets Kierkegaard’s ‘T he Sickness 
unto Death” as a prepositional discourse. For Theunissen, metaphors seem to be merely ornamental; 
for Adorno, they are deceptive, though in a very eloquent kind of way.
It is worth noting that several scholars have expressis verbis drawn a link between the 
Christological concept o f the “mors mortis” (see p. 7) and Adorno’s dialectics. See Scheible (1980), 
36; Hochstaffl (1976), 208ff.
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externally approximates it to art. So much the better art is able to survive by the strength of 
its own law of form. (KKA 14)™
Accordingly, Adorno strictly opposes readings that appreciate the poetic quality of 
Kierkegaard ’ s writings.
This praise [of the aesthetic quality of Kierkegaard’s works] dishonors the poetry^ * as well as 
philosophy. As opposed to the sheer possibility for confoundment, like that of Gottsched’s, 
the first concern of the construction of the aesthetic in Kierkegaard’s philosophy is to 
distinguish it from poetry. (KKA 5)
What is revealed by art is essentially the faultiness of the age in which Kierkegaard 
was entrapped. His aesthetic figures are “marked by that peculiar characteristic of 
semblance typical of many illustrations of the first half of the nineteenth century.” 
(KKA 7) The meaning of the important term “semblance” will become cleai" in due 
course. Semblance, suffice it to say at this point, means that a gap opens up between 
what a thing pretends to be and what it actually is; this gap is characteristic of the 
times to which Kierkegaard is bound.
™ The meaning o f the phrase “law for form” will become clear below. I do, however, want to mention 
one later text o f Adorno that casts light on this phrase; In his essay “The Position o f the Narrator in 
the Contemporary N ovel”, Adorno compresses some remarks about the functionality o f form that 
appear to elaborate the idea he refers to in the quoted passage. Adorno starts off by stating that it was 
not possible any longer “today” to tell a story, and yet the form of the novel requires narration 
(Adorno (1991), 30; on the “impossibility” of telling a story in the early 20'*’ century see also 
Benjamin (1986b), 83-107, 83ff.; both Adorno and Benjamin refer to “the war,” though Benjamin is 
referring to the First World War, Adorno to the Second World War). In order to tell a story, one would 
need to have something particular to say, but that is “precisely what is prevented by the administered 
world, by standardization and eternal sameness.” (Adorno (1991), 31) If one were to dwell on the 
concrete reality “nowadays”, Adorno writes, then one would “be guilty o f a lie; the lie o f delivering 
himself over to the world with love that presupposes that the world is meaningful” (Adorno (1991), 
30), which means that one falls prey to kitsch and commercialism. (See also Adorno (1951 [= 
aphorism 5]), 30: “All participation [in society’s pleasures] is masked and silent acceptance o f the 
inhuman” [translation my own], which implies: “Only the absolute lie maintains the freedom to tell 
the truth” (Adorno (1951), 197 [=aphorism 71, translation my own]; “absolute bondage can be 
recognised, but not depicted” (Adorno (1951), 272 [= aphorism 94, translation my own]). But -  unlike 
painting -  the novel cannot emancipate from its object; a novel is bound to resemble a report by its 
form. Consequentially, the form of the novel, the narration o f a plot in the world, prohibits its very 
nature, that is, to tell. The paradox can only be met by a counter-paradox. Therefore, the novel must 
run against its (realistic) form: “If the novel wants to remain true to its realistic heritage and tell how 
things really are, it must abandon realism that only aids the facade in its work o f camouflage by 
reproducing it." (Adorno (1991), 32) This is what has led e.g. Proust, Jacobsen and Rilke to take leave 
of the report form by dissolving the outer world in “extreme subjectivism” (Adorno (1991), 32); in the 
modern novel, “reflection breaks through the pure immanence of form” (Adorno (1991), 34). Thus, 
the form of the novel, by running up against the conventional (narrative) form of the novel, “takes a 
stand against the lie o f representation” (Adorno (1991), 34), i.e., against the lie that one was able to 
present anything special at all, rather than reproducing the standards by coercion. ‘This destruction of 
form is inherent in the very meaning o f form” (Adorno (1991), 34), Adorno puts it, and this enables us 
to understand the above quoted sentence better; By the means of its own destruction, the form allows 
the novel to tell once more.
At the heart o f this critique lies a somewhat vulgar understanding o f poetry. “Poetry” is apparently 
understood to be utterly unironically, displaying only the perspective o f the lyrical I -  unlike e.g. the 
drama or the novel. Reading Kierkegaard’s work as poetry would mean to accept the perspective 
taken by the lyrical I as the key entity for the understanding of the meaning o f the poem. This is what 
Adorno calls takeing a text “at face value” (KKA 198).
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Kierkegaard lived in a time that, according to Adorno, experienced the decay of 
human existence; it was a decay that had philosophical reasons. The objectless 
inwardness, i.e., a particularly Fichtean way of prioritizing the I prominent in 
Kierkegaard’s age, caused the I to loose its grip on the outer world. According to 
Adorno, this historical phenomenon is the key to understanding Kierkegaard.
What Kierkegaard describes as “the decay of everything fundamental to human existence” 
was called, in the philosophical language of his age, the alienation of subject and object. Any 
critical interpretation of Kierkegaard must take this alienation as its starting point. [...] 
Kierkegaard conceives of such [i.e., ontological] meaning, contradictorily, as radically ■ 
developed upon the “I,” as purely immanent to the subject and, at the same time, as 
renounced and unreachable transcendence. -  Free, active subjectivity is for Kierkegaard the 
bearer of all reality. (KKA 27)
Adorno acknowledges that Kierkegaard had aimed to exist outside of society, thus 
avoiding making a contribution to it. Yet precisely by doing that, he falls into a 
sociological category, i.e., that of the rentier.
By denying the social question, Kierkegaard falls to the mercy of his own historical 
situation, that of the rentier of the first half of the nineteenth century. (KKA 47f.)
[Kierkegaard] gives testimony to the isolation of the individual, living on private income, 
shut in on himself; an isolation that, in the period of late German romanticism, was 
expressed in the philosophy only by Arthur Schopenhauer. Kierkegaard was well aware of 
his affinity to Schopenhauer [...]. (KKA 8)
Kierkegaard is one of the last “Dandies”^^ , and at the same time, he anticipates the 
upcoming era of the metropolis.
Kierkegaard, in fact, reminiscing on the period of Either/Or, refened to himself as a 
flaneur^^ and thereby fostered a corporeal similarity of his own image to that of a 
Baudelarian Dandy. But it is precisely in the dense nexus of these similarities that the 
differences make themselves sharply apparent. Aestheticism is no “deportment,” to be 
assumed at will. It has both its hour and place; the eaiiy history of the metropolis. It is there, 
like artificial street lighting, in the twilight of incipient despair, that this strange, dangerous, 
and imperious form emits its beam to eternalize, garishly, life as it slips away. (KKA 7)
In the area of the metropolis, the real is being swallowed by the artificial; 
“semblance” is the pretension of genuine meaning in a world that has lost its own 
light. The reified world brings forth melancholy. Melancholy, however, is very 
meaningful: it speaks of and mourns for that which has been lost.
The melancholy that characterises Kierkegaard’s figures must be understood as 
the designating mark of his whole theory of existence, which, I repeat, falls into the
See Garff (2004), 137; Huizing (2003).
Later on, Kierkegaard remarks: “The flaneur promenades the room; the world appears to him
reflected by pure inwardness.” (KKA 41)
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On the healing power o f critical thought, see also Adorno (1974), 247: “Finale. -  The only 
philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all 
things as they would present themselves from the standpoint o f redemption. [ ...]  To gain such 
perspectives without velleity or violence, entirely from felt contact with its objects -  this alone is the 
task o f thought. It is the simplest of all things, because the situation calls imperatively for such 
knowledge, indeed because consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror-image 
o f its opposite.’’ To achieve such a perspective o f insight is still an arduous task, for the domination 
(of the reified world) forbids cognition o f the suffering that it produces; see Adorno (1951), 106. This 
sentence may remind one o f Theunissen’s idea o f prolepsis. Yet the differenceis that Adorno’s idea of 
a different standpoint is utopian if not messianic, while Theunissen’s is descriptive.
The words “star o f reconciliation” obviously call to mind Rosenzweig’s “Star of Redemption”, first 
published nine yeai’s before Adorno’s book on Kierkegaard (i.e., in 1921). Adorno speaks o f “Gestirn 
der Versohnung” rather than o f “Stern der Erlosung” (KKA 98). Nonetheless, 1 find it rather likely 
that Adorno was thinking of Rosenzweig’s work and, wanting to avoid an immediate quotation (for 
whatever reason), chose to paraphrase the title o f Rosenzweig’s book.
™ “Objectless inwardness strictly excludes objective history [ ...] .” (KKA 33)
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traps of the philosophy of his age. In this very process, Kierkegaard’s writings give 
testimony of the sadness of the historical world he lives in.
[T]ruth subordinates itself to melancholic semblance through semblance’s own dialectic. In 
its semblance melancholy is, dialectically, the image of an other. Precisely this is the origin 
of the allegorical character of Kierkegaard’s melancholy. (KKA 61; see also KKA 64)
Consequentially, melancholy becomes transparent as “semblance” (KKA 64), that is, 
it becomes discernible that melancholy is not a diversion of genuine subjectivity, but 
rather the truth about the Romantic theory of subjectivity. The exposure of the true tx. ! 
nature of melancholy is the means towards its redemption (KKA 64), for the 
diagnosis that melancholy contains provides a hint about the therapy. The therapy 
consists in the kind of interpretation that penetrates through the surface and beholds 
the suppressed truth about human existence in its crisis.
When his philosophy -  in the name of existence -  takes objectless inwardness and mythical 
conjuration as substantial reality, it capitulates to the semblance that it rejects in the depths 
of oblivion. Semblance, which illuminates thought from the remoteness of the images like 
the star of reconciliation, burns in the abyss of inwardness as an all-consuming fire. It is 
sought out and named in the abyss, if the hope that it radiates is not to be forfeited by 
knowledge, (KKA 6Tf*
This brightening of a star of redemption^^ must now be explored in more detail.
3.3. The eloquence of Kierkegaard’s failure
According to Adorno, the theoretical centre of Kierkegaard’s thought, i.e., the “total” 
I, is finally nothing but a pure spectator (KKA 27), uninvolved in the world that 
suiTOunds it. History is thus being devaluated^^, it is only the “inner” history that is 
supposed to have meaning; consequentially, the world itself is lost. And yet
ii
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Kierkegaard involuntarily shows that this absolutisation of the I is aporetic.^^ For 
Fichte, the outer world is constituted by the I, for Kierkegaard, in contrast, the I is 
constituted by being thrown back from the outer w o rld .T h u s, Kierkegaard portrays 
the power of the outer world in a way that could not be more efficient; by showing 
how the attempt to constitute oneself in a way that discharges the outer world fails.
When Fichte’s idealism springs and develops out of the centre of subjective spontaneity, in 
Kierkegaard the I is thrown back onto itself by the superior power of otherness. (KKA 29)
As a consequence, the historical situation of Kierkegaard becomes pressingly' 
apparent in his writings, in spite of the fact that Kierkegaard disregarded it. 
Kierkegaard, unlike Fichte, fails to subdue reality to the all-encompassing I. He 
experiences the resistance of the objective reality -  but fails to draw any constructive 
conclusions from this experience. Therefore, his writings give testimony to the 
objective reality precisely as reality intrudes into them, shattering the apparent 
consistence of his theory.
In Kierkegaard’s “situation,” historical actuality appeal's as reflection. Indeed, it appears re­
flected, literally thrown back. The haider subjectivity rebounds back into itself from the 
heteronomous, indeterminate, or simply mean world, the more clearly the external world 
expresses itself, mediated, in subjectivity. (KKA 38)™
The subject is unable to coerce reality; in this respect, Kierkegaard differs from his 
Romanticist age, or more particularly, of the Fichtean strand of early German 
romanticism that Kierkegaard was looking at. At the same time, the subject fails to
By “aporetic”, I mean literally that the conceptualised journey o f the self leads into a dead-end: The 
self cannot constitute itself as pure consciousness, because the self is irreducibly entangled in the 
objective world. The attempt to conceptualise a self that is superior to the external world is aporetic, 
for the external world will always haunt the I.
™ This corresponds to the reading o f the opening passage o f “The Sickness unto Death”, where the 
catastrophe o f the allegedly autonomous 1 is described (see above p. 14ff.)
On this idea o f rebound, see also: KKA 95: ‘“You transform something accidental into the absolute, 
and, as such, into the object o f your admiration. This has an excellent effect, especially on excitable 
souls’: the sentence from ‘The Rotation method’ remains ironic as long as the severed external world 
remains dark and deprived of any truth. But the flash of light that is reflected back on the world, as 
soon as the dialectic is referred to truth by way of ‘occasion,’ suffices to reestablish to a certain degree 
the legitimacy o f the collapsed eternal world.” Philip Roth, to whose work we will soon turn, 
articulates a very similar experience of “rebound” in his “The Human Stain”. Delphine Roux 
rehearses her motivation to leave France for the USA as follows: “1 will go to America and be the 
author of my life, she says; I will construct myself outside the orthodoxy o f my family’s given, I will 
fight against the given, impassioned subjectivity carried to the limit, individualism at its best -  and 
she winds up instead in a drama beyond her control. She winds up as the author o f nothing. There is 
the drive to master things, and the thing that is mastered is oneself.” (Roth, HS 273) Delphine Roux 
therefore fails in her attempt to achieve that which Coleman Silk, her antagonist, had intended to do: 
“At Howard he’d discovered that he wasn’t just a nigger to Washington, D.C. [...] . He was Coleman, 
the greatest of the great pioneers o f the I. [ ...]  Never for him the tyranny o f the we that is dying to 
suck you in, the coercive, inclusive, historical, inescapable moral we with its insidious E pluribus 
unum. [...] Instead the raw I with all its agility.” (Roth, HS 108)
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relate to reality/being**^^ in any meaningful or constructive way; in this respect, 
Kierkegaard betrays that he remains trapped in Romanticism. This failure of the I to 
coerce reality/being involuntarily gives testimony for the meaning of reality/being.
Concealed being, enciphered “meaning,” produces dialectical movement, not blind 
subjective coercion. This raises Kierkegaard above romantic efforts of reconstruction that 
claim to be able to recreate ontology whole, phenomenologically. (KKA 31)
The deeper meaning of Kierkegaard’s aesthetics is that it gives testimony to its 
meaningful failure. Interpretation must take Kierkegaard literally and observe how-' 
his words turn themselves up against the meaning that he meant them to have.
There is no way to meet up with him in the fox kennel of infinitely reflected interiority other 
than to take him by the word; he is to be caught in the traps set by his own hand. [...] Thus, 
the interpretation of Kerkegaaid’s pseudonymous writings must break down the 
superficially simulated poetic coherence into the polarities of his own speculative intention 
and a traitorous literalness. (KKA 12)
Kierkegaard’s words are turned up against him because they, again, are drenched 
with the ideology of his times. It is precisely by being obviously drenched with the 
external that Kierkegaard’s words give testimony for the overwhelming power of the 
external, while this very power was denied by Romanticism. Meaning then evolves 
as something which is not intended in the words, but splits off from them by 
necessity if the interpreter observes them closely enough.
Whereas according to every undiminished theological doctrine the signifying and the 
signified are unified in the symbolic word, in Kerkegaard the “meaning” separates from the 
cipher of the text. (KKA 26)
Kierkegaard’s reflections about the spirituality of despair provide a very vivid 
example of the working of the text. It has been noted before that Kierkegaard defines 
the human being as “spirit”, whereas the very nature of that spirit gives birth to 
despair. Despair and spirit are proportional. From this it follows that the most 
spiritual being must also be the most desperate. The most spiritual and 
consequentially the most desperate being is the devil. ***^
“The devil’s despair is the most intense despair, for the devil is sheer spirit, and therefore 
absolute consciousness and transparency; in the devil there is no obscurity that might serve 
as a mitigating excuse, his despair is absolute defiance.”™^ All this could just as well be said
I U Ü Adorno speaks o f “being,” though he does not mean “being” in the ontological sense, but in the 
historical sense o f that which is historically the case in the real, external worlds That is why I write: 
“being/reality.”
See below p. 31.
Kierkegaard does not explain this hypothesis. He must be referring to theological speculations that 
I was not able to trace.
Adorno cites from Kierkegaard, SD 42 = S.V. XIX 154.103
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of objectless inwardness [i.e., Kierkegaard’s concept of the subject] that does not know a 
priori “whether other human beings” in the world “exist,” (KKA 56)
While wanting to describe another’s despair, Kierkegaard in fact expresses the 
aporia in which his own system is caught This aporia, again, consists in the self that 
attempts to constitute the whole world by virtue of his or her spontaneous, spiritual 
act which inevitably falls prey to the mechanism of this world. “Hope” comes in the 
guise of a vague light at the most distant end of the tunnel.
He [Kierkegaard] prefers to let consciousness circle about in the selfs own daik labyrinth’"-”' ■
and communication passageways, without beginning or aim, hopelessly expecting hope'^ '* to 
flare up at the end of the most distant tunnel as the distant light of escape, rather than 
deluding himself with the fata morgana of static ontology in which the promises of an 
autonomous ratio are left unfulfilled. (KKA 32)
Hope therefore shines forth in a kind of way that is comparable to the vague light 
that radiates from the “Law”.
The procedure is then repeated with regard to Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel: 
Kierkegaard’s system of the spheres of existence mirrors Hegel’s portrayal of the 
evolution of selfhood. Yet Kierkegaard differs from Hegel in that this evolution is no 
longer perceived as a continuous development that sublates contradictions within the 
self and between the self and its other, but as a “leap”:
Differing from Hegel, however, contradiction is not sublated by the concept; rather, it 
remains as a sign of the brittleness of an existence from which ontological meaning is 
hidden. Total contradiction is called the “leap” [...]. (KKA 89)
According to Kierkegaard, the leap consists of the spiritual sacrifice^^^ of the natural 
self. This, again, reflects the spiritualising character of Kierkegaard’s works, which 
corresponds to the idealism of his times. Yet again, by failing to maintain this notion 
consistently, Kierkegaard’s writings reveal the shortcomings of idealism. This 
applies particularly to one aspect of Kierkegaard’s work that is highly important for 
this essay: the dying of the self. Adorno points out that Kierkegaard’s theology of 
sacrifice suggests that one must perish in order to become oneself. (KKA 153)*°^
The annihilation of natural life, originating in the statue of the commander™ ,^ is correctly 
understood as ghostly. For here it is not merely natural life that is destroyed by the spirit; 
spirit itself is annihilated natural life and bound to mythology. (KKA 109)
St. Paul’s notion o f  “hope against hope” (Rom. 4,18) may be resounding in these words.
Adorno points out that “sacrifice is the dialectical structure o f his œuvre” (KKA 115).
As we have seen, “The sickness unto Death” does not maintain this view (see above note 39); but 
its overall intention is similar in so far as Anti-Climacus demands that the self be “broken” (SD 65 = 
SV, XI 177).
Adorno is referring to Kierkegaard’s adaptation o f the closing scene o f Wolfgang Amadeus 
Mozart’s Don Juan.
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The self is subjected to disaster due to the aporetic nature of Kierkegaard’s 
spiritualising account of selfhood. But disaster releases hope for being otherwise. 
This is why those passages in Kierkegaard’s writings that are straightforwardly 
immersed in despair mark a climax of Kierkegaard’s œuvre.
Its [shattered melancholy’s] ruins are the ciphers on which Kierkegaard reflects, and hope is 
integral to the absurdity of its desire. The order of the spheres is inverted. There where 
Kierkegaard supposes only the discontinuity and contingency of total melancholy, the 
natural impulse, even if denied fulfilment, clings to the names of its objects; in his 
philosophy hope nowhere insists more stubbornly than in the aesthetic “Diapsalmata,” whose 
fragmentariness, according to Kierkegaard’s hierarchy of spheres, results from the incapacity 
of the aesthetic to achieve continuity. (KKA 124)**^®
This passage clears the way for a differentiated account for Adorno’s understanding 
of “aesthetics” . Hope inheres in the unfulfilled images that reflect the reconciliation 
between the outer, nature, and the inner, spirit, which Kierkegaard is unable to 
express in prepositional diseourse;
Nature and reconciliation communicate in melancholy; from it the “wish” arises 
dialectically, and its illusion is the reflection of hope [...]. The sphere of the aesthetic, which 
Kierkegaard, employing the eategories of his paradoxical system of existence, the 
speeulative deeeption of objective metaphysics, and the subjective how of communication -  
just to be able to discard it as discontinuous; this sphere, painfully furrowed by a subjectivity 
that leaves its traces behind in it without ever mastering it, receives the structure from 
images that are present for the wish, without having been produced by it, for the wish itself 
originates in them. The realm of images constitutes the absolute opposite of the traditional 
Platonie realm. (KKA 127)
The sphere of the aesthetic, which is a posture of existence and not to be confused 
with the theory of art, reveals hope in a way which is itself of interest to aesthetics as 
theory of art: The aesthetic form of the descriptions of the aesthetic posture releases 
images; these images reveal a longing that is inscribed in this posture but cannot be 
expressed directly. The impossibility of direct expression, again, is due to 
Kierkegaard’s entrapment in romantic idealism, which systematically excluded true 
reconciliation of nature and spirit by absolutising the latter. This logic of the 
aesthetic function of the aesthetic realm amounts to a logic of constructive 
destruction: the fragmentariness of existence is the last remaining means for the 
aesthetic “construction” of hope in averse conditions.
See also KKA 139: ‘Therefore it is no the total self and its total structure, but exclusively the 
fragment o f collapsing existence, free o f all subjective ‘meaning’, that is a sign of hope.” On the 
disclosing character o f despair see also Adorno (1951), 308.
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3.4. The logic of constructive destruction in the context of Adorno’s œuvre
Having elaborated the logic of constructive destruction in Adorno’s reading of 
Kierkegaard, I will briefly consider other references to this logic in Adorno’s 
writings in order to see how broadly this idea extends within Adorno’s œuvre. In his 
interpretation of Kafka, Adorno writes about the function of the aesthetic in contrast 
to the “symbol”:
If the term of “symbol” within the aesthetic (a term that is uncanny) should have any 
significant meaning at all, then it can only be as follows: the individual elements of the 
artwork point beyond themselves by the force of their context, so that their totality can be 
integrated in meaning without any loss. Nothing could be more inadequate with respect to 
Kafka [...]. Every sentence stands there in its literal cast, every [individual] sentence has a 
meaning [by itself]. They [the individual sign and meaning] aie not fused as the concept of 
symbol suggests. They fall apart, out of their abyss glares the ray of fascination.
The idea that meaning evolves in the gap between the literal meaning of the word 
and its “actual” meaning has been the horizon of Adorno’s “Construction of the 
Aesthetic”, which counters conceptions of art that see art as synthesis (i.e., synthesis 
of form and content).
Art is not synthesis, as convention holds, it shreds synthesis by the same force that affects 
synthesis.*’®
In his Negative Dialectics, Adorno modulates this idea once more;
The means employed in negative dialectics for the penetration of its hardened objects is 
possibility -  the possibility of which their reality has cheated the objects and which is 
nonetheless visible in each one. But no matter how hard we try for linguistic expression of 
such a history congealed in things, the words we use will remain concepts. Their precision 
substitutes for the thing itself, without quite bringing its selfliood to mind; there is a gap 
between words and the thing they conjure. [...] Benjamin’s concepts still tend to an 
authoritarian concealment of their conceptuality. Concepts alone can achieve what the 
concept prevents. Cognition is a rpwna; Uaetai.***
This important passage is particularly hard to understand. The claim that the objects 
are “cheated” amounts to Adorno’s often repeated observation that the reified world 
devours any particularity. In Kierkegaard, idealism has taken over the metaphors; 
“history is congealed” in them. But this catastrophe of language can not be fought 
from any standpoint outside of language; the wound must be healed with the same 
instrument that has struck the wound in the first place ([6] xpcnactç LaoeiccL*’^ ).
*™ Adorno (1997a), 255.
*‘® Adorno (1997), 139. In his “Minima Moralia”, Adorno suggests that the destruction o f art is its 
salvation (Adorno (1951), 132).
*** Benjamin’s concepts still tend to an authoritarian concealment of their conceptuality. Concepts 
alone can achieve what the concept prevents. Cognition is a xpcooaç Ldoftai. Adorno (1973), 53.
**^  There exists an antique folklore belief that assumes that the wound must be healed by the weapon 
that struck it. Collard comments on Apollodorus, Epit 3,20 (which tells of the healing of Telephos
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Adorno’s analysis, which exhibits how and r/zar reality cheats the objects is a means 
to do that. But analysis can do nothing but turning that which is already there against 
itself -  this shows how close Adorno is to deconstruction.**®
As it has been the case for millennia, Kafka is searching for redemption by incorporating the 
power of the enemy.**'*
3.5. Summary: Suffering and aesthetics
Adorno’s reading of Kierkegaard enacts a logic of constructive destruction: 
Kierkegaard’ works ‘fail’, but they do so in a meaningful kind of way.**  ^ Adorno 
rarely refers to suffering in his reading of Kierkegaard, but the kind of interpretation 
that he enacts could provide a model for the overcoming of suffering. Adorno’s 
reading of Kierkegaard’s writings is a constructive destruction on a communicative 
level; Kierkegaard’s writings both deconstruct themselves (and one another)**^ and 
simultaneously illumate the shortcomings of their age and the hope for redemption. It 
is this mechanism of constructive destruction that we will now explore by reading 
Franz Kafka, Gershom Scholem and Philip Roth.
The logic of constructive destruction is laid bare by an analysis of what Adorno 
calls the “constmction of the aesthetic”, which in fact should be called the 
constructive auto-deconstruction of the aesthetic. The aesthetic “as such” falls under 
the verdict of lure and ornamentation. Adorno strictly opposes a reading that accepts 
Kierkegaard’s propositions and hails the splendour of their form. Instead, Adorno 
wants to show how the aesthetic cast of Kerkegaard’s writings subverts the claims 
that apparently are meant to be endorsed by the aesthetic, hence I call this working of 
the text a “constructive auto-deconstruction of the aesthetic”.
from the rust o f the spear with which he was struck): “The cure of the wound by an application to it of 
rust from the weapon which inflicted the hurt is [..,] clearly a folklore remedy based on the principle 
of sympathetic magic (Collard (1995), 51; see Preiser (2000), 277; Preiser (2001), 375, note 944, with 
references to Plato’s Gorgias (Plato (1983)), 447b; I do not see, though how the word “curing” in this 
passage relates to the idea o f [o] xpoioaç Ido^xat). Collai’d refers to Frazer (1921), 51, who lists further 
examples o f this believe. -  In his Minima Moralia, Adorno refers to a similar idea: “The usuriousness 
o f the healthy is as such always already the sickness. Its antidote is the sickness as recognised 
sickness, the delimitation o f life itself.” (Adorno (1951), 136 [= aphorism 40, translation my own]) 
“Dialectical thinking is the attempt to break the coercive character o f logic by means of its own 
devices.” (Adorno (1951), 284 [= aphorism 98, translation my own].
See Schmidt (2006), 49.
Adorno (1997a), 285 (translation my own). Adorno must be thinking of the following entry: “To 
use the horse o f the offender for one’s own ride. Only possibility. But what power and acumen that 
requires!" (T 359); see Brandie (1984), 30. Kafka’s literary strategy is also linked with the idea that 
wounds take an active part in the process o f healing: “Rather than healing neuroses, Kaflca searches 
for the healing power within these, i.e., the power of cognition: the wounds that'society burns into the 
individual are being read as ciphers o f the untruth of society, as the negative [image] of truth.” 
(Adorno (1997a), 262 [translation my own])
It is only in his later writings that Adorno explained more thoroughly in which respect such a 
literary strategy corresponds to a communicative necessity (see above note 90).
See Schmidt 2006.
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Finally we must ask more pointedly; What does Adorno’s reading of 
Kierkegaard imply for a reflection about suffering that is located at the crossroad of 
theology, philosophy and literature?**^ Adorno shows that decay can illuminate 
redemption,**® The remainder of this essay will exhibit further guises of the 
illuminative qualities of decay. As regards aesthetics, the import is less exciting than 
one may have expected. Adorno’s book is not q/zom? aesthetics, and Adorno never 
contrasts his understanding of aesthetics to “the poetic”, which he discharges.**** 
Eventually, what Adorno says about Kierkegaai'd applies to Adorno as well: Every 
insight into Adorno is to be wrung out of his own context. **^*^ Adorno was himself 
trapped in his own negativism. He condemned the culture of his age on the whole; 
Kierkegaard’s writings are seen as the evolution of the contemporary catastrophe of 
culture. I disagree with this reading in so far as redemption should not be restricted 
to the negation of what there is, lest life be turned into an endless deferral. Adorno’s 
negativistic thought ought to be counterbalanced with a careful attempt to appreciate 
life, i.e., the life that we do have. But in spite of this correction that I would suggest, 
the structure of Adorno’s reading is vibrant. We will now turn to Kafka, particularly 
to Gershom Scholem’s reading of Kafka, where we will find similar motives.
The present study does not rehearse Adorno’s explicit analyses o f suffering. These have been 
severely criticised for being rather undifferentiated; see Geuss (2005), 129f.
Adorno has inherited this idea from Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer (see Wiggershaus 
(1998), 30).
' See above note 91.
See KKA 13; “Every insight into Kierkegaard is to be wrung out of his own context.”
37
4,Su ffering more recently: Franz Kafka, the untimely Sabbatianist
The following reading will focus on the motive of constructive destruction with 
reference to Kafka. The diversity of theoretical approaches to Kafka is so great that it 
was claimed no other corpse of writing had received as much attention as Kafka’s 
writings did and had been interpreted in such a great variety of different ways.*'*  ^ In 
what follows, I start from one particular approach to Kafka, namely that of Maurice 
Blanchot, for Blanchot is focussed on aspects of Kafka’s works that are pivotal for 
this essay.*"*® I will then continue to explore Gershom Scholem’s reading of Kafka, 
for Scholem (implicitly) links Kafka constructive destruction.
4.1. Kafka, theology, Kierkegaard
4.1.1. Blanchot on Kafka: Writing of disaster
Maurice Blanchot lays particular emphasis on the notion of reversal in his reading of 
Kafka in “The Space of Literature”.
There is no d en ying  that distress is his elem ent. It is his abode and h is “tim e.” But this 
distress is never w ithout hope. This hope is often only the torm ent o f  distress -  w hich does  
not g ive  hope, but prevents one from  getting enough even  o f  despair and determ ines that 
“condem ned to d ie, one is a lso  condem ned to defend o n e se lf  right up to the last” -  and 
perhaps at that point assigned  to reve rse  condem nation into deliverance. "*"*
This remark on Kafka’s “reversal” attributes to it the power to raise Kafka to heights 
that other people can only sense -  one could feel reminded of Kierkegaard’s 
discourse on the “thorn in the flesh.”*"*® And yet Blanchot is aware that the working 
of the negative in Kafka is highly complex and sublime, for the outcome of the work 
is utterly incalculable.
F ew  texts are m ore som ber, yet even  those w hose outcom e is w ithout hope remain ready to 
be reversed to express an ultim ate responsibility, an unknown triumph, the shining forth o f  
an unrealizable claim . B y fathom ing the negative, he g ives it the chance to becom e positive, 
but on ly  a chance, a chance w hose opposite keeps show ing  through and that is never 
com pletely  fu lfilled . *"*^
Matt (1999), 305, see Jahraus / Neuhaus 2002, 28.
On Blanchot’s reading o f  Kafka see Jasper (2004), 163f.
*'*'* Blanchot (1982), 270: “Deprivation o f  the world is reversed, becoming a positive experience, that 
o f another world where Kafka is already a citizen, where, granted, he is only the littlest and most 
anxious, but where he also knows staggering heights and enjoys a freedom whose value other men 
sense.”
[...] With the help o f  the thorn in my foot 1 leap higher than anyone with feet in the best 
condition.” (JP 6011 = Pap. VII A 156 [1847]).
Blanchot (1995), 7.
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What makes Blanchot’s comments particularly interesting for this essay is the fact 
that he relates reversal to a dialectics of loss and gain, for this very same logic has 
been instantiated by the Lurianic Kabbalah. Blanchot describes the dialectics of loss 
and gain as follows:
What he has to win is his own loss, the truth of exile and the way back into the heart of 
dispersion. This struggle can be compared to the profound Jewish speculations, when, 
especially after the expulsion from Spain, religious minds tried to overcome exile by pushing 
it to its limits.’'*^ “ .
Blanchot also relates Kafka to Jewish mysticism with respect to the dialects of loss 
and gain in his essay “Kafka and Literature.”
Literature [...] becomes an ‘assault on the frontiers,’ a hunt that, by the opposing forces of 
solitude and language, leads us to the extreme limit of this world, ‘to the limits of what is 
generally human.’ One could even dream of seeing it develop into a new Cabala, a new 
secret doctrine from centuries ago that could recreate itself today and begin to exist starting 
from, and beyond, itself [...]. The ancient idea from the Cabala, in which our downfall seems 
our salvation and vice versa, perhaps lets us understand why art can succeed where 
knowledge fails: because it is and is not true enough to become the way, and too unreal to 
change into an obstacle. [Art] destroys itself while it survives.’'’®
This reference to the Kabbalah is particularly vibrant as Blanchot draws a connection 
between Kafka’s aphorism that inspired the title of this essay and the notion of 
Kabbalah.
How can one destroy, when destruction is the same as that which it destroys or even, like the 
living magic’'”’ of which Kafka speaks, when destruction does not destroy, but constructs? 
[...] So Art is the place of anxiety and complacency, of dissatisfaction and security. It has a 
name: self-destruction, infinite disintegration. And another name: happiness, eternity.
We will elaborate the link between constructive destruction and the Kabbalah 
shortly.*®* This analysis will be philosophical rather than aesthetic; therein it takes a 
different route from the one that Blanchot suggests. The reason is simply that 
Blanchot’s vibrant, expressionistic sentences can hardly be discussed or tested, 
unlike the philosophical analysis of the relationship between Kafka and the 
Kabbalah.
Blanchot (1982), 70. Blanchot quotes from Scholem (1995), 250: “ There was an ardent desire to 
break down the Exile by enhancing its torments, by savouring its bitterness to the utmost (even to the 
night o f  the Exile o f  the Shekhlna itself).” Scholem is referring to the Lurianic Kabbalah.
’'’® Blanchot (1995), 18f.
Blanchot obviously refers to the aphorism from which I have borrowed the title o f  this study: There 
is an enchantment accompanying his [i.e., the aesthete’s in Kierkegaard’s “Either/Or” on which Kafka 
is here meditating -  J.S.] argument o f  the case. One can escape from an argument into the world o f  
magic, from an enchantment into logic, but both simultaneously are crushing, all the more since they 
constitute a third entity, a living magic or a destruction o f the world that is not destructive but 
constructive.” (WP 118 (emphasis mine)
’ “^ Blanchot (1995), 26.
See p. 46ff.
9 :
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This investigation of the religious dimension of Kafka’s work against the 
backdrop of the (kabbalistic) idea of “constructive destruction” will (hopefully) be 
far more fecund than the rather abstract quest for ‘Kafka’s relation to 
Judaism/theology’. In order to be able to move beyond previous discussions of 
Kafka’s relation to religion and theology in a competent kind of way, we must first 
of all acquaint ourselves with these.
4.1.2. Kafka, Theology, and Kierkegaard
One of the earliest and possibly the most prominent theological reading of Kafka had 
been attempted his friend Max Brod. Early on, Brod has received much criticism, 
particularly from Walter Benjamin, who found Brod’s reading of Kafka so 
completely aberrant that he eventually said that the friendship of Brod and Kafka was 
not one of the smallest riddles of Kafka’s life.*®^  In his book “Despair and 
Redemption in Franz Kafka’s Work”, Max Brod proposes that Kafka’s work holds 
fast to the ultimate meaningfulness of being in the face o f crisis.*®® This claim is 
obviously hard to sustain, particularly as regards e.g. the ending of The Trial, where 
K. dies “like a dog”.
A pointed criticism of theological readings of Franz Kafka can be found in a few 
remarks by Guattari and Deleuze, who forcefully point out that Kafka’s works imply 
no transcendence. The “law”, Guattari/Deleuze argue, is immanently senseless; 
nothing occasions the claim that the law was transcendent.*®"* Guattari’s and 
Deuleuze’s critique should make the reader alert of inadequate theological 
appropriations o f Kafka as “negative theology.”*®® I would agree that Kafka’s works 
contain rather few references to a transcendent realm. But this does mean to say that 
Kafka’s works could not be meaningfully related to theological problems (in ways 
other than ethical).
Scholem (1989), 222f.
Brod (1959), 23.
“If the ultimate instances are inaccessible and cannot be represented, this occurs not as a function 
o f  an infinite hierarchy belonging to a negative theology but as a function o f  a contiguity o f  desire that 
causes whatever happens to happen always In the office next door.” (Deuleuze / Guattari (1991), 50). 
See also op. cit., 44f.
Kafka’s work does show affinities to Christian mysticism. I will take up only one note that uses the 
metaphor o f  fire with which we have engaged ourselves in our brief look at Christian mysticism: In a 
letter to his confidante Grete Bloch, Kafka is pondering that there were “[...]  only two kinds o f pure, 
tearless happiness, touching the very limits o f  our strength: to have a person who is true to one, to 
whom one is true; and secondly to be true to oneself and spend oneself utterly, burn oneself up 
withoîU leaving any ashes. (LF 533f. [emphasis mine]) This metaphor obviously resembles Meister 
Eckhart’s and St. John o f  the Cross’s words (see above section 1.3.1). But Kafka’s writings operate in 
totally different circumstances. The laboring o f  the negative is observed by all three o f  these thinkers, 
but Kafka lacks the sense that this laboring is embedded in a narrative that is heading for a good end. 
Although Kafka is deeply concerned with a negativity that motions towards positivity, he has lost the 
faith in either Jewish or Christian traditions that guarantee the eventual meaningfulness o f  suffering 
and negativity, the progress o f history and the successful dialects o f  the self. This possibility o f  
burning oneself up without leaving ashes is an utterly theoretical possibility for Kafka; it is a demand 
that cannot be fulfilled.
' t
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Recent interpretations of Kafka have been equally hesitant to attribute particular 
religious dimensions to them. I will briefly comment on Ritchi Robertson’s reading 
of K a f k a . R i t c h i e  Robertson entitles his chapter about Kafka’s aphorisms 
Reflections from Damaged life, borrowing the subtitle from Theodor W. Adorno’s 
Minima Moralia. Reflections from Damaged Life^^^. This silent reference is worth 
looking at more closely. The fact that the reference to Adorno remains implicit is 
characteristic in so far as Robertson himself avoids any dialectical sort of thinking 
and rather relies on a plain, humanistic and conservative ideal of (domestic) human 
life.*®® Critical theory intrudes into Robertson’s book again when Robertson clainîs—. ‘i * 
in the subsequent chapter that “[p]hilosophers like Schopenhauer interpreted the 
world, Kafka wants to change it.”*®^ The Zürau-aphorisms, Robertson proposes, 
reflect Kafka’s search for new foundations that are to replace the religious 
foundations, which have become obsolete.*^** Certainly it is true that Kafka was very 
concerned with the possibility of leading a “conventional” life, yet it is obvious that 
he was interested in this question in a very solipsistic kind of way. His very personal 
incompetence at matrimony and its causes and implications concerned him. Although |
recent research on Kafka has suggested that Kafka did show some interest in the 
political situation of his times*^*, overall he remains a solipsistic thinker whose 
journal entries and letters are rarely concerned with the foundations of the society. It 
is therefore dubious whether Kafka aimed for the improvement of humanity and
adapted “religious imagery” to that purpose, as Robertson suggests.’*^
I
----------------------------------------
Robertson (1985).
Adorno (1974).
"... The first o f  many signs that the proper object for his efforts is not the Castle but integration into 
domestic life.” (Robertson (1985) 243; see also op. cit. 268ff.)
Roberston (1985) 219. See Marx 11®' thesis on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted  
the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” (Marx / Engels (1984), 286) Marx’ 
statement is taken up by Adorno, who agrees with its content and directs it against the existing 
philosophy o f  his times: “The summary judgement that [philosophy] had merely interpreted the world, 
that resignation in the face o f  reality had crippled in itself, becomes a defeatism o f  reason after the 
attempt to change the world miscarried.” (Adorno (1973), 3)
“Being wholly deprived o f  the shelter o f  a religious community, he has to start building from 
scratch, and such a task, though not unique in kind, may well be unique in its magnitude. The task is 
accomplished through the aphorisms: in them Kafka ponders the last things in order to establish the 
principles on which the new community o f the future must be founded.” (Robertson (1985), 191; see 
also 215: “[ ...]  [T]he aphorisms are the circuitous path that leads Kafka to this neighbour.”
Stach (2004), 5 3 Iff. et. al.
“Religion is not an illusion, as Freud thought, since for Kafka the religious impulse is essential to 
humanity; but it must always be under an illusion. Hence the imagery o f  religion is valid as the 
expression o f the religious impulse, but misleading as an interpretation o f  that impulse. Kaflta is 
therefore debarred from making any such straightforward use o f  religious imagery as he found in 
Maimonides and his other source: he can only use religious imagery with qualifications. One method 
o f  qualifying it is the eclecticism that we noted in D er Prozefi. If Kafka uses a religious image, he 
must promptly deny its claim to privileged authority by following it with an image from a different 
tradition.” (Roberston (1985), 241) B. Hawkins takes a veiy similar approach: “Ultimately, each [I.e., 
Franz Kafka, Paul Celan, and Edmond Jabès] will reject this kind o f  God -  as a reality -  and opt 
instead for an ethics originating from humanity, an ethics that persists in spite the nonexistence o f  a 
personal, saving, speaking God. At most, God can be accepted as a necessary illusion, a voluntary 
deception to the production o f  ethics.” (Hawkins (2003), xxviii.)
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The burden of this study will be to look at Kafka’s work, its theological valences 
and its implications for the understanding of suffering in a way that is more 
differentiated than the approach that Robertson takes. Robert Alter takes a much 
more careful approach by acknowledging that Kafka remained bound to tradition 
even though the mode in which he did so may be strongly problematic. Kafka’s 
negativity, again, always has an inclination to capsize into the positive, as Blanchot 
has pointed out. Kafka’s relation to the reversal of the negative into the positive is 
highly complex, for he -  like Benjamin and Scholem -  fully exposes himself to 
historical circumstances that are averse to any attempt to “recover” Judaism.*^® For 
all three thinkers, Alter points out,
[...] [T]here can be no real return to origins, where God once stood now stands 
melancholy.* "^*
The significance of this substitution will be discussed shortly. But before that, I will 
make a few comments on Kafka’s relation to Kierkegaard; after we have acquainted 
ourselves with Kierkegaard’s references to negative experiences, the question ought 
to be mentioned how Kierkegaard relates to Kafka in view of the notion of the 
reversal of the negative into the positive. Again, a comprehensive account of the 
countless links between Kierkegaard and Kafka would exceed what can be done in 
the present study**®®; I will only give one example.
In his study on Kierkegaard and Kafka, Fritz Billeter compares the form of 
Kafka’s and Kierkegaard’s writings on a somewhat abstract level. Interestingly, he 
does refer to the aphorism that inspired the title of this essay when he points out that 
for Kafka,
writing poetiy does not mean to stir oneself but to devour oneself, thus writing is turned into 
a means of mystic destruction, which is constructive. (“Es wird ihm zum Mittel mystischer 
Zerstorung, welche aufbauend isf’).*^ ^
Yet Billeter does not interpret this idea of constructive destruction at all, and he 
hardly draws a connection between Kierkegaard’s and Kafka’s accounts for the 
necessity of negativity.
The “gateway” for any discussion of Kafka’s relation to Kierkegaard, one of the 
most often cited o f all of Kafka’s aphorisms, shall be looked at before we move on to 
consider some of Kafka’s negativistic ideas. Kafka positions himself in relation to 
(amongst others) Kierkegaard as follows.
“Kafka, Benjamin, and Scholem variously launched on a daring experiment in the recovery o f  
Judaism under historical circumstances that made such an undertaking difficult, ambiguous, fraught 
with spiritual dangers, perhaps unfeasible.” (Alter (1991), 22)
Alter (1991), 19.119.
On Kafka and Kierkegaard see also Gray / Gross / Goebel (2005), 159f.; Billeter (1965); Adorno 
somewhat obscurely remarks that “Kafka was a diligent reader o f  Kierkegaard, but belongs to 
existential philosophy only in so far as one speaks o f  “annihilated existences” (Adorno (1951), 431 
[aph. 143j).
Billeter (1965), 97.
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I have brought nothing w ith  m e o f  w hat life  requires, so  far as I know , but only the universal 
human w eak ness. W ith this -  in this respect it is a gigantic strength -  I have v igorously  
absorbed the n egative  elem ent o f  the age in w hich  I live, an age that is, o f  course, very c lo se  
to m e, w h ich  I have no right ever to fight against, but as it w ere a right to  represent.
The slight am ount o f  the positive, and also o f  the extrem e negative, w hich  cap sizes into 
the p ositive, are som eth ing  in w h ich  I have had no in h erited  share. I have not been guided  
into life by  the hand o f  C hristianity -  adm ittedly now  slack  and failing -  as Kierkegaard w as, 
and have not caught the hem  o f  the Jew ish prayer shaw l -  n ow  fly ing  aw ay from us -  as the 
Z ionists have. I am end or beginning.
Kafka can theoretically understand the idea of progress of history (Zionism) and o f- ,., 
the successful dialects of the self (already “slack and falling” in Kierkegaard), and 
yet he feels debarred from traditions that have faith in that the negative will capsize 
into the positive. He is disinherited from traditions whose ideas he can grasp 
intellectually, but not appropriate.
This does not, however, mean that Kafka was denying a progression of the 
negative towards the positive altogether. On the contrary, Kafka’s aphorisms circle 
around the radical dialectical possibility that the negative ruptures for the sake of the 
positive. Such a rupturing, for Kafka, is utterly incalculable, and its result is 
unforeseeable.
4.1.3. Constructive Destruction as reversal
This intermingling of construction and destruction has been at the horizon of this 
entire study. The title of my work is inspired by the following entry from Kafka’s 
aphorisms:
There is an enchantm ent accom panying h is argum ent o f  the case. O ne can escape from an 
argum ent into the w orld o f  m agic, from an enchantm ent into log ic , but both sim ultaneously  
are crushing, all the more sin ce  they constitute a third entity, a liv in g  m agic or a destruction  
o f  the w orld that is not destructive but constructive."’®
Recourses to this statement in Kafka-research interpret the text as a reflection about 
(Kierkegaard’s) literary strategy. In his book “Constructive Destruction”, a study of 
the aphoristic form of Kafka’s work, Richard T. Gray comments with respect to the 
title of his work that it refers both to the form and to the content. Aphoristic 
discourse, Gray points out, is a means of expression in which
self-critique and self-projection  productively interrelate to produce a “constructive  
destruction” o f  the se lf, i.e. dism antling and reconstruction o f  the s e l f  accom plished through 
a sp ecific  textual m ed iu m .’*®^
WP 114 (emphasis mine).
WP 118.
Gray (1987). In her master-thesis “Aufbauende Zerstbrung” {“Constructive Destruction"), Kolesch 
conceives o f  “aufbauende Zerstorung” as an auto-deconstruction o f  the text (Kolesch (1996), 56).
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Gray then indicates that this process of constructive destruction occurs by means of 
textualisation. The emphasis of Gray’s work consequentially lies on the form of the 
aphorisms.
In what follows I will try to credit the content more than Gray did. Constructive 
destruction is first all an existential necessity that Kafka talks of in a rather 
straightforward language;
K now  y o u rse lf does not m ean: observe yourself. O bserve yo u rse lf is the w ord o f  the serpent.
It means: M ake y o u rse lf  the m aster o f  your acts. The word therefore m eans: M iscom prehend  
yourself! D estroy yourself! N am ely  som eth ing bad, and on ly  i f  you  kneel deep ly , you  also "- 
hear the good , w h ich  says: “ in order to m ake y o u rse lf w hat you  are.” *™
In order to avoid a w ord-m istake: W hat shall be destroyed actively  m ust be held in v iew  and 
in hand tightly  before. “I f  . . .  y o u  m ust d ie” m eans: R ecognition  is both at the sam e time: A  
step to eternal life  and an obstacle from it. I f  you  desire to  ach ieve eternal life after 
su ccessfu l recognition  -  and yo u  w ill have no other option but w anting to , for recognition is 
this w ill -  then you  w ill have to  destroy yourself, the obstacle, in order to construct the step, 
i.e ., destru ction . T he banishm ent from  paradise w as not an act, but an event.*®"*
In order to understand the (possible) biographic background of Kafka’s deliberations 
about necessary negativity and indeed suffering, I will explore a few texts where 
Kafka summarised his existential ailment. In 1915, Kafka summarises his ailment in 
a letter to Felice as follows:
M y suffering is fourfold:
I cannot live  in  Prague. I d on’t know  i f  I can life elsew h ere, but that 1 cannot live here is 
the m ost defin ite thing I know .
Furthermore: T his w h y  I cannot have F. at present.
Furthermore: I cannot help  (it is even  in print) admiring other p eo p le’s children.
Finally: A t tim es 1 fee l I shall be crushed by these torm ents on every side. But my  
present suffering is not the w orst. The w orst is that tim e passes, that this suffering m akes me 
more w retched and incapable, and prospects for the future grow  increasingly more dismal.*™
The reason why Kafka cannot live with Felice is ultimately located in his literary 
work that he felt unable to abandon. He describes his life as being torn back and forth 
between two forces, one inclining towards Felice, the other, stronger force keeping 
him with his work. The only help for him would be destruction / shattering.
In m e there have a lw ays been, and still are, tw o se lves w restling w ith each other. One o f  
them  is v e iy  m uch as you  w ould  w ish  him to be, and by further developm ent he could  
ach ieve the little he lacks in order to fulfil your w ishes. N on e  o f  the things you  reproached  
m e w ith at the A skan ische H o f  applied to him . The other se lf, how ever, thinks o f  nothing but 
work, w hich is his so le  concern; it has the effect o f  m aking even  the m eanest thoughts appear 
quite normal; the death o f  h is dearest friend w ould seem  to be no m ore than a hindrance -  if  
on ly  a temporary one -  to his work; this m eanness is com pensated for by the fact that he is 
also  capable o f  suffering for his work. T hese tw o se lves are locked  in com bat, but it is no 
ordinary fight w here tw o pairs o f  fists strike each other. The first s e l f  is  dependent on the
™ Kafka, KA.
Kafka, KA, 78 (translation my own; emphasis mine).
172 LF 583.
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second; he would never, for inherent reasons never, be able to overpower him; on the 
contrary, he is delighted when the second succeeds, and if the second appears to be losing 
the first will kneel at his side, oblivious to everything but him. This his how it is, Felice. And 
yet they are locked in combat, and yet they could be yours; the trouble is that they cannot be 
changed unless both were to be destroyed.
The last words contain what could be the most concise expression of the dilemma 
that Kafka faced: The only possible way to salvation would lead through destruction, 
and this would need to be a kind of destruction the end of which would remain 
incalculable. This means that destruction would need to be embarked, while the aim-r.. 
of the destruction may not be anticipated.
I shall take a brief detour in order to emphasis how profound such a movement 
is, and how closely it links with contemporary ideas. The paradoxical situation of a 
subject reminds one of Lévinas’s and Derrida’s discourses on the “gift”.'^ '^  A pure 
gift of the other, Levinas and Derrida both argue, would be an event where 
something occurs that is beyond intentionality, for as soon as a subject beholds a gift, 
it is inscribed in the circle of exchange. Phenomenologically speaking, a pure 
receptiveness towards alterity can only occur if the subject is being devoured, while 
in this very process, something falls out of the decay and remains. Kafka enacts this 
very logic in his aphorisms on dying:
One of the first signs of the beginning of understanding is the wish to die. This life appears 
unbearable, another unattainable. One is no longer ashamed of wanting to die; one asks to be 
moved from the old cell, which one hates, to a new one, which one will only in time come to 
hate. In this there is also a residue of belief that during the move the master will chance to 
come along the corridor, look at the prisoner and say: “This man is not to be locked up again. 
He is to come with me.”“^^
And another passage reads:
I gave orders for my horse to be brought around from the stable. The servant did not 
understand me. I myself went to the stable, saddled my horse and mounted, in the distance I 
heard a bugle call. I asked him what this meant. He knew nothing and had heard nothing. At 
the gate he stopped me, asking; “Where are you riding to, master?” “I don’t know,” I said, 
“only away from here, away from here. Always away from here, only by doing so can 1 
reach my destination.” “And so you know your destination?” He asked. “Yes,” I answered, 
didn’t I say so? Away-From-Here, that is my destination.” “You have no provision with 
you,” he said. “I need none,” I said, “the journey is so long that I must die of hunger if I
LF 564.
Derrida (1994). This problem emerges even before Marcel Mauss’ essay on the gift (Mauss
(2001)), Derrida’s primary reference, was published, i.e. in Friedrich Nietzsche (see Tugendhat 
(2004), 38f.) and Georg Simmel (1892f), 85ff. -  A more thorough exploration o f  Derrida’s possible 
contribution to this essay would inquire the links particularly between Derrida and Adorno’s “negative 
dialectics”. See the survey o f  this discussion in de Vries (2005), xvii, who points to the work o f Jürgen 
Habermas on this question. Derrida and Adorno meet particularly in their critique o f “automatic” 
understanding (see Adorno’s critique o f  the “symbol” above) and their insistence on the deferment o f  
understanding, its irreducible dependence on temporal and potentially aesthetic processes. See Menke 
(1991), 191 et. al.
175 29 „ Further discussion o f this passage would include Kafka’s meditations on the “Hunter-
Gracchus” motif, see Krdck (1974).
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don’t get anything on the way. No provisions can save me. For it is, unfortunately, a truly 
immense journey
Both passages are similar in structure: In either text a journey from here to “there” is 
embarked. The journey will not lead to a desirable end, except for the occurrence of 
an incalculable event: The master must come along the corridor; a provision of a 
kind that “you can’t take with you” must be found.” The aphorism can be read as a 
model for the process of mortification. Mortification, which does not know that death 
is a “good investment” can only be motivated by an unattainable hope, i.e., a kind 
of hope that in no way has access to its own fulfilment. Mortification is then' 
accompanied by a hope against hope, as it were, that in the process of mortification, 
an incalculable event should occur. On a different level, we will find a similar logic 
in Scholem’s reading of Kafka.
185.
177 See Derrida (1978). On “mortification” see Alitzer (1997), 152; on the “mors mystica” see Haas 
(1979); Wagner-Egelhaaf (1989), 18.
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4.2, Scholem about Kafka: The meaning of negativity
4.2.1. Collapse and nothingness
In what follows, I will give a brief account of Gershom Scholem’s reading of Kafka. 
This reading was mainly developed in the correspondence between Gershom 
Scholem and Walter Benjamin. The first plot in Scholem’s and Benjamin’s exchange ' 
about the theological dimension of Kafka’s^ ^^  work refers to the question how 
Kafka’s “failure” ought to be evaluated. Benjamin has recourse to Kafka’s last will 
that his writings be destroyed after his death. In this, Benjamin sees a sign of Kafka’s 
failure.
H e did fail in h is grandiose attempt to convert poetry into doctrine, to turn it into a parable 
and restore to  it that stability and unpretentiousness w hich , in the face o f  reason, seem ed to 
him  to be the on ly  appropriate thing for it. N o  other writer has obeyed  the com m andm ent 
‘T hou shalt not m ake unto thee a graven im age’ so faithfully.
In relation to this assumption that Kafka’s attempt had been a failure, Benjamin 
remarks at a different instance that Kafka’s work amounted to a tradition falling ill.
K afka eavesdropped on tradition, and he w ho listens hard d oes not see. [ . . . ]  The m ain reason  
w hy this eavesdropping dem ands such effort is that on ly  the m ost indistinct sounds reach the 
listener. There is no doctrine that one could  learn and no kn ow led ge that one could  preserve. 
The things one w ish es to catch as they rush by are not m eant for a n yon e’s ears. This im plies 
a state o f  affairs that negatively  characterizes K afka’s works w ith  great precision. (Here a 
negative characterisation probably is altogether more fruitful than a  positive one). K afka’s 
w ork represents tradition falling ill. W isdom  has som etim es been d efined  as the epic side o f  
truth. Such a defin ition  marks w isd om  o f f  as a property o f  tradition; it is the truth in its 
aggadic con sisten cy . It is this con sistency  o f  truth that has been lost. [ . . . ]  K afka’s real genius 
w as that he tried som ething entirely new: he sacrificed truth for the sake o f  cling ing  to 
transm issib ility , to its aggadic elem ent.
Regarding this interpretative perspective on Kafka’s relation to tradition, Scholem 
articulates his own interpretation of negativity in Kafka.
It seem s to m e that the w ay o f  looking at things y o u ’v e  taken is excep tion ally  w orthw hile  
and prom ising. B ut I w ould  like to understand what you  take to be K afka’s fundamental
I am here referring to a thematic complex, not to a chronological section. On the chronology o f 
Scholem’s engagement with Kafka see Mosès (1992), 190ff. -  Kafka and Scholem never met, Kafka 
had heard o f  Scholem (B 2 231, Sept. 1916 to Felice Bauer), yet Scholem learned about this only in 
retrospect (Scholem (1977), 86).
Benjamin (1986b), 125. Benjamin emphasises the meaning o f Kafka’s failure again in a later letter: 
“To do justice to the figure o f  Kafka in its purity and its peculiar beauty, one must never lose sight of 
one thing: it is the figure o f  failure. The circumstances are manifold. There is nothing more 
memorable than the fervor with which Kafka emphasized his failure. His friendship with Brod [who 
faded that aspect out -  J.S.] is to me above all else a question mark which he chose to ink in the 
margin o f  his life [ . . .] .” Scholem (1989), 226.
Scholem (1989), 224.
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failure, which you virtually embed at the heart of your reflections. You really seem to 
understand this failure as something unexpected or bewildering, whereas the simple truth [is] 
that the failure was the object of endeavors that, if they were to succeed, would be bound to 
fail. Surely that can’t have been what you meant. Did he express what he wanted to say? Of 
course. The antinomy of the aggadic you mention is not specific to the Kafkaesque Aggada 
alone; rather it is grounded in the nature of the aggadic itself.
The illness of tradition is by no means an accident or a coincidence. Tradition, thus 
Scholem, has to pass through seasons respectively storms, in which there are 
moments of descent. - (
Does this opus really represent “tradition falling ill” in your sense? I would say such an 
enfeebling is rooted in the nature of the mystical tradition itself: it is only natural that the 
capacity of tradition to be transmitted remains as its sole living feature when it decays, when 
it is on the crest of a wave. I believe Î have already written you something along the same 
line in connection with discussions on Kafka. I don’t know how many years it must be since 
I made notes, in the context of my studies, on questions such as the mere possibility of 
transmissibility, and I would like very much to hunt them out again. It seems to me to 
emerge in the context of the question about the “essence” of the righteous, the type of the 
“saint” evident In a decaying Jewish mysticism. -  That wisdom is a property of tradition is 
entirely true, of course: it has the essential unconstructability of all the possessions that T
inhere in tradition. It is wisdom that, when it reflects, comments rather than perceives. If you 
were to succeed in representing the borderline case of wisdom, which Kafka indeed does 
represent, as the crisis of the sheer transmissibility of truth, you would have achieved 
something truly magnificent. This commentator does indeed have Holy Scriptures, but he 
has lost them. Thus the question is: What can he comment upon? I take it that you would be 
able to answer these questions within the perspectives you expounded. But why “failure” -  
since he really did comment, if only on the nothingness of truth or whatever might emerge 
there? So much for Kafka
Failure thus is an inherent necessity of tradition’ -  a thought that is tightly linked to 
Scholem’s studies in Jewish mysticism. In his “Ten unhistorical sentences about 
Kabbaiah“, Scholem writes:
Real tradition remains obscure; only decaying tradition falls onto its object and becomes 
discernable only in its decay.
The reason for the obscurity of tradition, thus says Scholem (from the orbit of 
negative t h e o l o g y ) i s  that there is an absolute beginning in tradition that is not 
depicted in human language, for language always diversifies. The closer tradition 
approximates this absolute beginning, the more visible becomes its divergence from 
it. Scholem also addresses the thought of a meaningful decay of tradition in the
Scholem (1989), 236.
Scholem (1989), 236f.
It is worth noting that this negativity o f  tradition that Scholem describes could be related to the 
Christian notion o f  kenosis and thus to the content o f  (Christian) tradition.
Scholem (1973), 264. On Scholem and Tradition, see also Scholem (1977), 54ff.
Scholem him self has been designated as a “negative theologian”. See Harnacher (1999), 168; see 
also op. cit., 42. Scholem said o f him self that he was not a negative theologian however (op. cit., 60); 
see also Biale (1979), 109.
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concluding words of his depiction of the history of Jewish mysticism. Here, he retells 
the following story:
W hen the Baal Shem  had a d ifficu lt task before him , he w ould  go  to a certain place in the 
w ood s, light a fire and m editate in prayer -  and w hat he had set out to perform w as done. 
W hen a generation later the “M aggid” o f  M eseritz w as faced w ith  the sam e task he w ou ld  g o  
to the sam e place in the w ood s and say: W e can no longer light the fire, but w e  can still 
speak the prayers — and w hat he w anted done becam e reality. A ga in  a generation later Rabbi 
M oshe L eib  o f  S assov  had to perform this task. A nd he too w ent into the w oods and said: 
W e can no longer ligh t a fire, nor do w e know  the secret m editations belonging  to the prayer, 
but w e  do know  the p lace in the w oods to w hich  it all b elon gs -  and that m ust be sufficient; " 
and su ffic ien t it w as. B ut w hen  another generation had passed and R abbi Israel o f  R ish in  w as  
called  upon to perform  the task, he sat dow n on his golden  chair in h is castle and said: W e 
cannot light the fire, w e cannot speak the prayers, w e do not k n ow  the p lace, but w e can tell 
the story o f  how  it w as done. A nd, the sto iy-teller adds, the sto iy  w h ich  he told had the sam e 
e ffect as the actions o f  the other three.
Scholem comments that his story could be read as the description of the decay of a 
great movement ~ yet this decay is not an endpoint of tradition, but a dialectical 
moment in its historical evolution.
Y ou can say i f  yo u  w ill that his profound little anecdote sym b o lizes the decay o f  a great 
m ovem ent. Y ou can a lso  say that it reflects the transform ation o f  all its values, a 
transformation so  profound that in the end all that rem ained o f  the m ystery w as the tale. That 
is the position  in w h ich  w e find ourselves today, or in w hich  Jew ish  m ysticism  finds itself. 
The story is not ended, it has not yet becom e history, and the secret life it holds can break out 
tom orrow in y o u  or in m e.
In the situation o f the decay of a great movement there remains nothing but the 
narrative of this decay, i.e., a narrative that accounts for the impossibility of 
performing the rite anymore. Kafka articulates this decay’ yet precisely by doing 
this, he remains in continuity with this tradition, no matter how vigorously he denies 
its contents. Kafka represents tradition as decaying respectively as decayed. But the 
decay of tradition is still a moment in the unfolding of tradition, and to sink into the 
contemporary decay of tradition may be the only means to maintain continuity with 
tradition. The decay of tradition is distinct from its final exitus in so far as the history 
of the decay itself can be told, which means that the relation to the tradition is not 
erased. Thus, the decay itself becomes readable as a moment in the history of 
tradition.’
The relation of tradition and the loss of tradition become more apparent in a 
second aspect of the conflict between Scholem and Benjamin that focuses on 
Benjamin’s claim that K’s “assistants” are like students who had lost the
Scholem (1995), 350.
See Mosès (1992), 207.
This notion again is designated by an enormous tension that can be found in the whole o f  
Scholem’s and Benjamin’s discussion o f Kafka: The negativity o f  the time that is reflected in Kafka’s, 
Scholem’s and Benjamin’s work is an abyss that may not be transfigured as an element o f  a general 
hermeneutic key.
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scriptures.’®^ In Scholem’s differentiating comment on Benjamin’s statement, the 
thin line between an utter loss of meaning on the one hand and a conservation of 
meaning in the midst of decay on the other hand becomes apparent one more time. 
Scholem consents to the observation that the relation to scripture is fractured, and yet 
he describes this relation in a way quite different from Benjamin.
Kafka’s world is the world of revelation, but of revelation seen of course from that 
perspective in which it is returned to its own nothingness. I cannot accept your disavowal of 
this aspect -  if I should really regard it as such, that is, and not just as a misunderstanding 
brought about by your polemics against Schoepsen and Broder. The nonfulfillability of what-T 
has been revealed is the point where a cort'ectly understood theology (as I, immersed in my 
Kabbalah, think, and whose expression you can find more or less responsibly formulated in 
that open letter to Schoeps you are familiar with) coincides most perfectly with that which 
offers the key to Kafka’s work. Its problem is not, dear Walter, its absence in a preanimistic 
world, but the fact that it cannot be fulfilled. It is about this text that we will have to reach an 
understanding. Those pupils of whom you speak at the end are not so much those who have 
lost Scripture -  even though a world in which that can happen is already not very Bachofen­
like either! -  but rather those students who cannot decipher it.'^ ®
Scholem differentiates between the ‘nonfulfillability’ (fUnvollziehbarkeiff) of 
revelation and its absence. This issue correlates to the question whether scripture is 
lost or whether it is unreadable. The notion of a revelation that is not lost and yet 
unfulfillable shall be explored in more detail. Benjamin responds to this passage of 
Scholem that the question whether scripture was merely lost or whether it was 
unreadable was of no impact.’^’ Yet Scholem insists that this question was indeed 
vital and that it was intimately related to his reading of Kafka.
You ask what I understand by the “nothingness of revelation”? I understand by it a state in 
which revelation appears to be without meaning, in which it still asserts itself, in which it has 
validity but not significance. A state in which the wealth of meaning is lost and what is in the 
process of appearing (for revelation is such a process) still does not disappear, even though it 
is reduced to the zero point’^  ^of its own content, so to speak. This is obviously a borderline 
case in the religious sense, and whether it can really come to pass is a very dubious point. 1 
certainly cannot share your opinion that it doesn’t matter whether the disciples have lost the 
“Scripture” or whether they can’t decipher them, and 1 view this as one of the greatest 
mistakes you could have made. When I speak of the nothingness of revelation, I do so 
precisely to chaiacterize the difference between these two positions.
The “nothingness of revelation” is a state in which revelation, although being 
“valid", is unfullfillable. Accordingly, the grammatical construction “nothingness of 
revelation” is be perceived of as a genitivus objectivus: the nothingness is a
Benjamin (1986a), 135: “His assistants are sextons who have lost their house o f  prayer, his 
students are pupils who have lost the Holy Writ. N ow there is nothing to support them on their 
‘untrammelled, happy journey.’”
Scholem (1989), 126f.
“Whether the pupils have lost [the Scripture] or whether they are unable to decipher it comes down 
to saying the same thing, because, without the key that belongs to it, the Scripture is not the Scripture, 
but life.” (Scholem (1989), 135.
It is worth noting that for Scholem, the “zero point” o f  language is lamentation; see Scholem 
(1995).
Scholem (1989), 142.
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nothingness that is left by God who is departing from the world’ -  by no means 
does the term “nothingness of revelation” imply that revelation has become nothing, 
or that there is nothing about revelation {genitivus subjectivus). The notion of the 
“unfullfillability of revelation”, again, is intimately bound to the very possibility of 
tradition:
We now face the problem of tradition as it presented itself to the Kabbalists. If the 
conception of revelation as absolute and meaning-giving but in itself meaningless is correct, 
then it must also be true that revelation will come to unfold its infinite meaning (which 
cannot be confined to the unique event of revelation) only in its constant relationship tb- 
histoiy, the arena in which tradition unfolds. Theologians have described the word of God as 
the “absolutely concrete.” But the absolutely concrete is, at the same time, the simply 
unfulfillable -  it is that which in no way can be put into practice. The Kabbalistic idea of 
tradition is founded upon the dialectic tension of precisely this paradox: it is precisely the 
absoluteness that effects the unending reflections in the contingencies of fulfilment. Only in 
the mirrorings in which it reflects does revelation become practicable and accessible to 
human action as something concrete. There is no immediate, undialectic application of the 
divine word. If there were, it would be destructive.
The nothingness of revelation corresponds to the meaninglessness of tradition, or 
more precisely: it corresponds to the “fact” that the Torah has become meaningless 
and yet reveals its meaning in this crisis of meaning.
Mysticism is the kind of labour that penetrates through to this nothingness. It 
foraminates the fragility of revelation within the world towards the primordial 
beginning, which is infinite being and infinite nothingness, as Scholem indicates in 
connection with his studies of Jewish’ *^’ and Christian m y s t i c i s m . T h e  nothing of 
revelation is, thus Mosès’ the nothingness of the Torah. The Torah resembles a 
script that has become unreadable and thus meaningless. Just like nothingness is the 
negative origin of being’^ ,^ likewise “revelation, which has yet no specific meaning, 
is that in the word which gives an infinite wealth of meaning.^®” In his On Kabbalah 
and its Symbolism, Scholem also refers to this notion with reference to Kafka.
See Wohlfarth (1995), 189.226. 
Scholem (1971), 296.
‘^ ^Scholem refers to Plato’s Timaeus. See Scholem (1970), 54; Plato’s discourse moves back and forth 
between affirmative and negative terms for the ground o f  being (Plato (1972), Tim 48eff.).
Scholem (1970), 89. In his poem on Kafka, Scholem writes; „Only so does revelation / Shine in the 
time that rejected you. / Only your nothingness is the experience / It is entitled to have o f  you.” 
Scholem (1989), 124. Benjamin quotes this verse and comments: “I endeavoured to show how Kafka 
sought -  on the other side o f  that ‘nothingness,’ in its inside lining, so to speak -  to feel his way 
toward redemption. This implies that any kind o f victoiy over that nothingness, as understood by the 
theological exegetes around Brod, would have been an abomination for him.” (Scholem (1989), 129) 
Mosès (1992), 199; Mosès Ç 987), 13-34, 23.
I am referring to the Lurianic Doctrina o f  Zimzum.
Scholem (1971), 282-303, 295. The notion o f a “language without meaning” reminds o f 
Benjamin’s essay “On Language as such and the Language o f Human Beings”: "'-There is. no such 
thing as a meaning o f  language; as communication, language communicates a mental entity, i.e., 
.something communicable p er  se.” (Benjamin 1986, 320) On the influence o f  this essay on Scholem 
see Scholem (1986) 65 (1 thank Christoph Balzer for alerting me to this passage); Hamacher (1999), 
166f.; Biale (1979% 103ff. Adorno may also have adopted Benjamin’s theology o f language (see 
Wiggershaus (1998), 44.
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The word of God must be infinite, or, to put it in a different way, the absolute word is as 
such meaningless, but It is pregnant with meaning. Under human eyes it enters into 
significant finite embodiments which mark innumerable layers of meaning. Thus mystical 
exegesis, this new revelation imparted to the mystic, has the character of a key. The key itself 
may be lost, but an immense desire to look for it remains alive. In a day when such mystical 
impulses seem to have dwindled to the vanishing point they still retain an enormous force in 
the books of Franz Kafka. And the same situation prevailed seventeen centuries ago in the 
Talmudic mystics, one of whom left us an impressive formulation of it. In his commentary 
on the Psalms, Origen quotes a ‘Hebrew’ scholar, presumably a member of the Rabbinic 
Academy of Caeserea, as saying that the Holy Scriptures are like a large house with many, 
many rooms, and that outside each door lies a key -  but it is not the right one. To find the 
right keys that will open the doors -  that is the great and arduous task. This story, dating 
from the height of the Talmudic era, may give an idea of Kafka’s deep roots in the tradition 
of Jewish mysticism.^^^
Kafka’s writings are therefore seen in connection with the inaccessibility of meaning 
that Talmudic mystics have commented on. The irreducible inaccessibility of 
meaning creates a space of undecidability between religion and nihilism.
[...] [M]any exciting thoughts had led me (in the years 1916-1918) ... to intuitive 
affirmation of mystical theses which walked the fine line between religion and nihilism. I 
later found (in Kafka) the most perfect and unsurpassed expression of this fine line, an 
expression which, as a secular statement of the Kabbalistic world-feeling in a modern spirit, 
seemed to me to wrap Kafka’s writings in the halo of the canonical.” *^’^
This “precise distinction between religion and nihilism” shall be investigated in more 
detail; 1 will take Scholem’s -  controversial® -  studies of Sabbatianism as a point of 
entry. Sabbatianism practices a negation of tradition without reserve, whereas this 
negation remains related to tradition -  even though in a most sublime kind of way. 
As is generally the case in messianic movements to which Sabbatianism counts, at 
the heart lies the desire for the end of suffering.
The most basic kind of expectation [of messianic prophecy] is at the individual level: the 
person hopes for a messianic redemption from his or her own sufferings and lowly condition, 
or perhaps from a burden of sin. Each person with messianic beliefs wants to believe that 
whatever scenario ultimately plays out, he or she will be saved from the evil and suffering 
afflicting his or her life.^ ®'^
I shall now investigate this intricate relationship between the negative and the 
positive more thoroughly.
4.2.2. Kaflka and the “constructive destruction” of Sabbatianism
In what follows, I will interpret the idea that tradition was to have meaning in the 
midst of the decay of meaning. The phenomenon of a heretical Kabbalah (Scholem
Scholem (1969), 12.
Biale (1979), 74-76; see Wohlfahrt (1995), 190; Alter (1995), 172; Biale (1985); see also Scholem  
(1971), 271.
See the survery that Hamacher provides. See Hamacher (1999),
Goldish (2004), 8f.
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sees Sabbatianism as an instance of a heretical Kabbalah)^’’^  is related to the problem 
of the necessary collapse of tradition in so far as Sabbatianism is looked at as a prime 
example of the collapse of tradition. First of all, the background of the doctrines of 
Sabbatianism must become clear. The structure of the world, thus the basic 
assumption of orthodoxy and Sabbatian heresy, is being internally amended through 
the process of “tikkun”, the restitution of all things, which envisions the role of Israel 
in the world as follows;
According to the recognized, orthodox interpretation, Israel has been dispersed among the 
nations in order that it may gather in from eveiy where the sparks of the souls and divine light 
which are themselves dispersed and diffused throughout the world, and through pious acts 
and prayers “lift them up” from their respective prisons.^® When this process is more or less 
complete, the Messiah appears and gathers the last sparks, thereby depriving the power of 
evil of the element through which it acts. The spheres of good and evil, of pure and impure, 
are ftom then on separated for all eternity.
Sabbatians “adapt” the concept of the process of Tikkun by radicalising the vision of 
the Messia’s descent into the (evil) world.
The heretic version of this doctrine [...] differs from the orthodox mainly in its conclusions: 
there are stages in the great process of Tikkun, more particularly its last and most difficult 
ones, when in order to liberate the hidden sparks from their captivity, or to use another 
image, in order to force open the prison doors from within, the Messiah himself must 
descend into the realm of evil,^“® [...] It can easily be seen how this doctrine satisfied those 
who thought they had experienced their own and the world’s salvation in their inner 
consciousness and consequently demanded a solution of the contradiction between their 
experience and the continuation of Ex i l e . The  apostasy of the Messiah is the fulfilment of
Scholem (1984), 163.
Scholem elsewhere points out that this is the most important heritage that Hasidism has taken over 
from the Kabbalah. See Scholem (1971b), 238. It is worth noting that Scholem ’s critique o f  Buber’s 
understanding o f  Hasidism expounded in this text brings up a point that is relevant for this study, as 
Scholem emphasis the irreducible negativity that is linked to the Hasidic adaption o f  this kabbalistic 
idea: “The teaching o f  the uplifting o f  the sparks through human activity does in fact mean that there 
is an element in reality with which man can and should establish a positive connection, but the 
exposure or realization o f  this element simultaneously annihilates reality, insofar as ‘reality’ signifies, 
as it does for Buber, the here and now. [...]  [P]recisely in that act in which we let the hidden life shine 
forth we destroy  the here and now, instead o f  -  as Buber would have it -  realizing it in its full 
concreteness.” (Scholem (1971b), 240f.; second emphasis mine) Commenting on the meditative 
communion with the vitality o f  all created things in prayers, Scholem points out that “[t]he actual and 
final realization o f  such a communion has a destructive qualitiy.” (Scholem (1971b), 242) The 
shortcoming o f  Buber’s account is essentially that he suppresses the Platonic elements in Hasidism 
(Scholem (1971b), 241)
Scholem (1995), 31 Of. See Scholem (1997), 132. On the historical conditions o f  the evolution o f  
Sabbatianism see also Bloom (1975), 14; Idel (1998), 183.
In another text, Scholem remarks that the fall o f  the messiah had been related to the suffering 
messiah who is depicted in Isaiah 53 (Scholem (1997), 138) -  which creates a link to the New  
Testament understanding o f  Jesus Christ that may have been articulated against the backdrop o f the 
tradition o f  the suffering messiah. It must be noted, though, that in contrast to the Christian tradition, 
the acts o f  the heretical messiah were not meant to be imitated (Scholem (1997), 140); they were seen 
as a necessary evil.
See also Scholem (1973a) 691 : “The various Sabbatian doctrines sought to bridge the gulf between 
the inner experience and the historic reality that was supposed to symbolize it.” On the historical 
conditions o f  the evolution o f  Sabbatianism Kabbalah see also Bloom (1975), 14; Idel (1998), 183.
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the m ost d ifficu lt part o f  h is m ission , for redem ption im plies a paradox w hich  becom es  
v isib le  on ly  at the end, in its actual occurrence.^‘°
The apostasy of the Messiah Sabbatai Sevi therefore succeeded in interpreting the 
conflict between a world of exile and a hope for redemption. In the person of the 
messiah, the clash between exile and hope climaxes. The paradox between religious 
symbolism and historical reality is transferred into religious symbolism itself. But 
this shift affects the whole Jewish belief-system. If the work of the Messiah must 
take a guise that is contrary to its aim, then the same must apply to any other aspect 
of Jewish belief, particularly to the understanding of the Torah: The logic of 
subversion must be transferred to the Torah, which means that the destruction of the 
Torah serves to unearth the true purpose of the Torah.^’ ’
W hat the Sabbatians call “the strange acts o f  the M essiah ,” have not on ly  a negative aspect, 
from the point o f  v ie w  fo (s ic!)  the old order, but also a p ositive  side, in so  far as the M essiah  
acts in accordance w ith  the law  o f  a n ew  w orld. I f  the structure o f  the w orld is intrinsically  
changed by the com pletion  o f  the process o f  Tikkun, the Torah, the true universal law  o f  all 
things, m ust a lso  appear from then on under a different aspect. Its n ew  sign ificance is one  
that conform s w ith  the prim ordial state o f  the world, now  happily restored, w hile as long  as 
the E x ile  lasts the aspect it presents to  the b eliever naturally conform s to  that particular state 
o f  th ings w h ich  is the G alu th . The M essiah  stands at the crossing o f  both roads. H e realizes 
in his M essian ic  freedom  a n ew  law , w hich  from the point o f  v iew  o f  the old  order is purely 
subversive. It subverts the o ld  order, and all actions w hich  conform  to it are therefore in 
m anifest contradiction w ith the traditional values. In other w ords, redem ption im plies the 
destruction o f  th ose aspects o f  the Torah w hich  m erely reflect the G alu th , the Torah itse lf  
remains one and the sam e, w hat has changed is its relation to the mind,^^^
In this respect, the abolition of all values amounts to a passage through the abyss of 
destruction.®’®
True faith remains hidden, which cannot be expressed in institutions, and the only expression that it 
finds are rituals that bring the power o f  the negative and o f the destructive to bear [...] . The power o f  
destruction is a constructive power.^'*'
The Sabbatians refer to the metaphor of the seed-corn®’ :^
The Torah, as the radical Sabbatians w ere found o f  putting it, is the seed-corn o f  salvation, 
and just as the seed -corn  m ust rot in the earth in order to sprout and bear fruit, the Torah 
m ust be subverted in order to  appear in its true M essian ic g lory. U nder the law  o f  organic  
developm ent, w hich  governs every sphere o f  existence, the process o f  Salvation is bound up
Scholem (1995), 311.
Note how this idea ties with Adorno’s reading o f  Kierkegaard, where the destruction o f  the 
metaphors also serves to unearth the true meaning o f  these metaphors.
Scholem (1995), 312.
Scholem (1984), 178.
Scholem (1973), 207 (translation my own). Scholem quotes Bakunin; see Scholem (1984), 131: 
“The lust o f  destruction is a creative lust.” (Translation my own)
See also 1. Cor. 15,36: “What you sow does not come to life unless it dies.”
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with the fact of man’s actions being, at least in certain aspects and in certain times, dark and 
as it were rotten?'^
The destruction that the Sabbatians pursued was therefore constructive.
4.2.3. Summary; Sabbatai Sevi, the rotten messiah
I will summarise briefly what Scholem’s analogy of Kafka and the Kabbala suggests. 
Kafka, it was said, writes in conditions where the meaning of tradition is lost. This " 
loss itself gives rise to suffering; we could call it a “transcendental homelessness.”®’® 
Scholem compared Kafka’s writings to a heretical Kabbalah, for which Sabbatianism 
is a prime example. Heresy is no mere frivolity. It is the last attempt to preserve 
tradition in conditions that make it impossible to preserve tradition. Tradition must 
attach the element of destruction that is at work in a world that is completely averse 
to the content of tradition. Scholem therefore describes the logic of Sabbatianism as 
an intermingling of construction and destruction. To stay in touch with the decay of 
tradition or even to immerse oneself into it is still to stay in touch with tradition. It is 
thQsubstitution of tradition by something else which is the end of it.®’®
Therein, it is structurally linked to Kafka’s thought, particularly the aphorisms, 
which circle around this same idea. But the link, again, is not restricted to structural 
analogy; the historical situation of Kafka and that of the Sabbatianists is likewise 
comparable. Both describe a fractured world; their inner lives cannot be harmonized 
with their historical reality. Restoration in the sense of simple repetition is not on 
option. The fragments cannot be joined; in contrast, the destruction must actively be 
brought to an end. Kafka, thus Scholem argues, is immersed into the downfall of 
(Jewish) tradition, but by being so, he may chance to hit the bottom, a point where 
the truth of tradition is felt once more precisely as that which is being lost. This 
process is strictly analogous to Adorno’s reading of Kierkegaard’s concept of the 
self: hope is precisely to be found in the fragments of existence.®’^
I will argue in the concluding chapter®®^  that these readings provide models. 
They cannot simply be turned into action; they are an aid for our reflection which 
still has a long way to go before concrete decisions can be made. The present study
Scholem (1995), 317.
Lukacs (1971).
Robertson’s and Hawkins’s substitution o f  Jewish tradition by ethics (see p. 39ff.) ultimately sells 
tradition -  as something into which we should transpose ourselves rather than the other way around -  
(Gadamer (1994), 292, Jasper (2005), 108) -  out to particular humanistic ideas that “we” (allegedly) 
still find accessible.
“Its [shattered melancholy’s] ruins are the ciphers on which Kierkegaard reflects, and hope is 
integral to the absurdity o f  its desire. The order o f  the spheres is inverted. There where Kierkegaard 
supposes only the discontinuity and contingency o f  total melancholy, the natural impulse, even if  
denied fulfilment, clings to the names o f its objects; in his philosophy hope nowhere insists more 
stubbornly than in the aesthetic ‘Diapsalmata,’ whose fragmentariness, according to Kierkegaard’s 
hierarchy o f  spheres, results from the incapacity o f the aesthetic to achieve continuity.” (KKA 124; 
see section 3.3)
See below p. 65f.
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offers models that might open our eyes to violent detours, though these detours may 
have to be taken when one travels in particularly averse circumstances. Kafka did not 
find peace on his own devices. The Sabbatians did not succeed in restoring Judaism. 
And certainly, to study the history of ideas does not mean to dig out old recipes. It 
means to acquaint oneself with configurations that may help us to understand our 
world and our options to act better. Constructive destruction is the opposite of a “rule 
of thumb”. It must be “applied” with extreme care. Destruction is never eo ipso 
constructive. But if we find numerous vibrant examples for kinds of destruction that 
were constructive within their particular circumstances, then it might be the case that, 
similar options are “available” to us.
We will now turn to a contemporary novel that appears to rely on Sabbatian 
thinking. The fact that this prize winning and much acknowledged novel possibly 
enacts Sabbatian logic might suggest how deeply these apparently awkward ideas are 
enrooted in (parts of) our culture.
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Since we read Kafka and Roth in this essay, it might be expected that I would dwell on the relation 
between Roth and Kafka. The influence o f the latter on the former has often been confirmed. Roth has 
written a piece “Looking at Kafka,” and he uses the opening sentence o f Kafka’s "The 
Metamorphosis"  in his "The Breast", It has been argued that "Portny's Complaint could be seen as an 
American version o f  Kafka’s Letter to His Father." (Tanner (1986), 64) Provocation is a means that 
both Kafka and Roth excessively employed (Shechner (2003), 151). Yet on the whole, the influence o f  
Kafka on Roth appears to be less interesting than the structural kinship, which consists in the motive 
o f destruction.
See Shechner (2003), vii. The full transcript o f  the interview can be found online: Plante (s.d.). 
With the attempt to criticise Roth’s novel “Sabbath’s Theater”, Wolcott claims that “his (Roth’s) 
flashlights got stuck in the hole.” (Wolcott (1995); quotation follows Shechner (2003), 152), I would 
argue that this observation is hardly a criticism, for what it points out has to happen by necessity; the 
abyss cannot be investigated in comfortable doses.
See above p. 52.
See below p. note 239.
I focus almost exclusively on this novel because in my esteem no other writing o f Roth would fit 
into the strand o f  thought that is here pursued as well as “Sabbath’s Theater” does. The idea o f  
constructive negativity does appear in others o f  his works, though. On the extremely lively sexual 
relationship o f  the protagonist o f  “The Human Stain”, Coleman Silk, with Faunia Farley, the narrator 
comments: “Who are they now? They are the simplest version o f  themselves. The essence o f  
singularity. Everything painful congealed into passion."  (FIS 203 (emphasis mine)
5.Su ffering just now: Sabbath ben Sabbatai, Philip Roth’s rotten prophet
5.1. Introduction: Sabbath and Sabbatianism
Philip Roth, who follows Kafka’s footsteps to some extent®®’, finally takes us to the 
present; or rather, it takes us to the substrata underneath our age. In an interview with 
David Plante, Roth compared his own work to that of two great colleagues of his in_ *  ^
the following way:
Updike and Bellow hold their flashlights out into the world, reveal the real world as it is 
now. I dig a hole and shine my flashlight into the hole.^ ^^
The mystical messiah Sebbatai Sevi, too, descends into the evil and dark realm®®®; 
Mickey Sabbath’s journey through life is likewise described as a descent?^^ In what 
follows, the suffering of Roth’s rotten prophet Sabbath, the protagonist of his 
Sabbath’s TheateP'^^, shall be related to the Sabbatian movement. The question 
whether the Sabbatian movement actually does loom behind the very name of 
“Mickey Sabbath” can not be finally settled, yet I do want to comment on the factors 
that are involved in asking this question.
The link that I am presupposing receives support fr om the following scene that 
occurs towards the end of the novel: Sabbath is visiting the graveyard where his 
ancestors lie; he points to a tombstone with the name “Shabas” and explains:
“There’s a relative of mine right there.” Sabbath pointed to a stone marked “Shabas.” Must 
be Cousine Fish, who’d taught him so swim. “The old-timers,” he explained to Crawford,
“were Shabas. They wrote it all kinds of ways: Shabas, Shabbus, Shabsal, Sabbatai.” (ST 
357 [emphasis mine])
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The last name of this list, significantly, is identical with the name of the founder of 
the Sabbatian movement; Sabbatai Sevi.®^  ^ The connection between Roth’s figure 
and the antinomian branch of 1 centuiy Judaism has been made before®®® and has 
been questioned, if not to say attacked®®®, notably by Mark Shechner. Whether or not 
one finds his case convincing®®  ^ is eventually not decisive for the reading that I am
See Scholem (1973a).
Unfortunately, I was unable to track the primary sources for this connection. Mark Shechner (see 
note 228) has kindly iirformed me upon my request that he only knows o f  such sources by hear-say, _ t
Shechner reports that he had “heard it suggested that the book’s antinomianism -  what was " ” '
proscribed is now mandatory -  explains the hero’s name: Sabbath after Sabbatai Sevi [ ...] . Maybe, 
though i f  so, it is no longer the restraints o f  Halakah, the law, that are being challenged but the Torah 
o f Normality and the wellness industries that have sprung up to serve it.” (Shechner (2003), 149f.)
Indeed there is a difference between Sabbath’s antinomism and that o f  the Sabbatians. This does not 
rule out the possibility that the two phenomena could illumine one another if  read in context. In the 
same essay, Shechner introduces the question once more; this time, he dismisses it straightforwardly.
“Possibly Roth did have him [Sabbatai Sevi] in mind, but even if  so w e can hold that as nothing more ;
than a curiosity, a resort to symbols for the delight o f  the symbol hunters. Finding the Sabbatai figure 
in a novel -  unless the novel is by Isaac Bashevis Singer -  is about as helpful as finding the Christ 
figure, that old expedient o f  readers from another era who, praying to turn up hidden symbols, could 
uncover a crucifix faster than you can say ‘Eli E li’ as a sign that a character has been ‘redeemed.’ The 
last thing w e can expect o f  Roth is either to grant indulgences to his characters or to attach his 
meanings to any liturgical system: Hasidic, Gnostic, Christian, Hindu, Jain, or Jubu-Jewish Buddhist.
To the end he w ill be loyal to his own brands o f  mishegas. Mickey Sabbath is a creature o f  nature, not 
religion or history, and he appeals to us in terms o f tumescence, not o f  Torah. Don’t bother looking 
for his prototypes in Gershom Scholem; try the police blotter. And anyway, Mickey Sabbath is an 
American and a madman o f  his time. In the old country, Jews didn’t urinate on the graves o f  their 
Croatian lovers, did they?” (Shechner (2003) 153) A few points should be made in response to this 
statement in order to explain why I do not feel obliged to follow Shechner’s imperative. The analogy 
with the anonymous interpreters who are excessively quick in offering Christological interpretations 
does not contain an argument. Why “the last thing that we expect” would be that Roth attaches 
meanings to liturgical systems remains obscure. Certainly Roth’s lUeraty characters are unlikely to 
subdue themselves to the demands o f  any authoritative religious institution. Yet to subdue oneself to 
the demands o f  an authoritative religious institution is quite different from attaching meaning to it. As 
a matter o f  fact, the situation that “religion” presently finds itself in could be described as 
characterised precisely by the persistence o f  meaning o f  religion after the loss o f  the power o f the 
institutions to impose belief either on a community or on the public. Mickey Sabbath, as we will see 
shortly, attaches meaning to religious questions in so far as he comments on them frequently. This 
does not mean to imply that he is a “creature o f  religion or history”, nor does it refute the claim that he 
is “creature o f  nature”. The assumption that Sabbath’s name bears allusion to the Sabbatians is worth 
pursuing in no way entails the claim that he was “creature o f  religion”, whatever Shechna might 
actually mean by that. Sabbath is certainly a creature o f  nature, just like any other creature is, 
regardless o f  whether one adheres to a secular or to a biblical world view  (“Adam” -  oix !), but 
acknowledging this fact is o f  little help for interpreting Roth’s novel. Shechna’s concluding rhetorical 
question draws our attention to the fact that Jews in the 17*’* century did not act as Mickey Sabbath 
did. (One may have to be reminded that Mickey Sabbath is a fictional character. Fictional characters 
tend to do things which “real” characters are unlikely to do, whilst revealing important features about 
the nature o f  the former in spite o f this difference. The whole genre o f  parody consists o f  the 
“unrealistic” yet meaningful exaggeration o f the actions o f non/fictional characters.) This may be the 
case. Customs and the ways in which they are being transgressed change in the course o f  time. This 
does not mean, though, that people who live (and transgress the customs that are valid in their 
cultures) in different times are utterly unrelated to one another or that eomparisons between them are 
meaningless.
™ In 1986, that is, before “Sabbath’s Theater” was published, Harold Bloom refers to the Kabbalah 
while introducing Roth in a way that emphasises the difference between the two: “Roth paradoxically 
is still engaged in moral prophecy; he continues to be outraged by the outrageous -  in societies, others 
and himself. There is in him nothing o f the Satanic editor, Shrike, in Miss Lonelyhearts, or o f 
Pyncheon’s Kabbalistic doctrine o f  sado-anarchism. Roth’s negative exuberance is not in the service 
o f negative theology, but intimates instead a nostalgia for the morality once engendered by the Jewish
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about to present: Even if Philip Roth had never heard of the Sabbatian movement®® ,^ 
Mickey Sabbath instantiates a figure who resembles Sabbatai Sevi, and it is 
interesting to compare these two Jewish heretics.
5.2. Sabbath’s suffering
The horizon of the following reading that frames this comparison is again the motive 
of “suffering”. Sabbath suffers greatly. I will explore the nature of his suffering first,.^ 
and then develop what consequences he draws from his suffering.
During the whole novel, the narrator addresses the reader directly at one single 
instance. The scene is as follows: Sabbath and Kathy Goolsbee are in his car after the 
accidental or unaccidental revelation of their erotic relationship; Kathy offers to 
satisfy Sabbath orally and Sabbath struggles to maintain his determination to reject 
the offer.®®’ The narrator takes side with Sabbath in his following appeal:
Not to hard on Sabbath, Reader. Neither the turbulent inner talkathon, nor the 
superabundance of self-subversion, nor the years of reading about death, nor the bitter 
experience of tribulation, loss, hardship, and grief make it any easier of a man of this type 
(perhaps for a man of any type) to get good use out of his brain when confronted with such 
an offer once. (ST 231)
The catalogue of Sabbath’s suffering rehearses all the many aspects of the misery he 
experienced. Loss is the most prominent of them. Sabbath loses his older brother 
Mickey, who dies a horrible death in action.^ ®^  His parent’s house was literally a 
house o f pain. It had, as it were, “suffering” written all over it.
We were one of those families with a gold star in the window. It meant that not only was my 
brother dead, my mother was dead. All day at school I thought, Tf only when I get home, 
he’s there; if only when the war is over, he’s there.’ What a frightening thing that gold star 
was to see when I came home from school. Some days I’d actually manage to forget about 
him, but then I’d walk home and see the gold star. Maybe that’s why people went to sea, to
normative tradition.” (Bloom (1986), 2) Since the antinomian branch o f  Kabbalah Is itself a 
phenomenon that mourns the times when the normative Jewish tradition and history were In harmony. 
Bloom ’s statements do not rule out the possibility that Roth’s “Sabbath’s Theater” were enacting a 
meaningful allusion the Sabbatian movement. As a matter o f  fact, what Bloom says about the conflict 
that Roth experienced. I.e., a conflict between norms and reality, strongly reminds us o f  the conflict 
that gave rise to the Sabbatian movement: “Roth Is a centrally Jewish in his fiction, because his 
absolute concern never ceases to be the pain o f the relations between husband and wife, and in him 
this pain invariably results from the incommensurability between a rigorously moral normative 
tradition whose expectations rarely can be satisfied, and the reality o f  the way we live now.” (Bloom  
(1986), 2)
The name “Sabbath” could simply not refer to anything, or it could have a different meaning: 
Kelleter (1998), 272ff., assumes that “Sabbath’s name” Is related to the aspect o f  “rest” that is 
associated with the Jewish Sabbath.
His struggle is particularly understandable as Sabbath knows at this point o f  time that his erotic life 
is overall declining. As a matter o f fact, during the span o f  his lifetime that the novel describes, 
Sabbath never engages in an erotic relationship. All three opportunities that he faces pass unrealised.
“Morty’s burns covered eighty percent o f  his body.” (ST 327)
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get the fuck aw ay from  the go ld  stai'. The go ld  star said, ‘P eop le have suffered som ething  
terrible in this h o u se .’ T he house w ith the go ld  star w as a b lighted  hou se .” (ST  144)
The second great loss that Sabbath experiences is that of his lover Drenka, who dies 
of cancer. Her death provides a frame of the whole novel. The opening scene of the 
novel ends with her exclamation that she is sick of cancer. Towards the end of the 
novel, Sabbath, who visited her sick-bed during the nights, describes her ailment.
Dranka, H er  death. N o  idea that w ould  be her last night. E v e iy  night saw  pretty much the 
sam e picture. G ot used  to it [ . . . ]  G ot used to  the oxygen  prong in  her nose. G ot used to tlfe -  
drainage bag pinned to the bed. Her k idneys w ere failing, yet there w as a lw ays urine there 
w hen I checked  the bag. G ot used to that. G ot used to the IV p ole  and the m orphine drip 
hooked to the pum p. G ot used to the upper part o f  her no longer look ing  like it belonged to  
the bottom  part. E m aciated  from  a little above the w aist, and from  the w aist dow n boy , oh 
boy, b loated, edem ic. The tum or pressing on the aorta, decreasing the blood flow  [ . . . ] ,  I f  
th ey ’d operated, sh e ’d have had bled to death. Cancer too w idespread for surgeiy. (ST  4 16 )
The experience of suffering and loss looms over Mickey Sabbath, His life is an 
outrage against the world, both against nature (respectively creation) and against 
culture. His outrage is religious, though in a very violent and destructive sense,
' It is in the face of outrageous suffering that Sabbath’s mission is carried out. 
Sabbath, the antagonist, unleashes the substratum of the (whole) society he lives in, 
i.e., North America in the 1990s, he realises everybody’s unlived desires. This is why 
Drenka shortly before her death of cancer says to him
Y ou a re  A m erica. Y es, you  are, m y w icked  boy. (ST  419  [em phasis P .R .])
5.3. Sabbath’s mission
Sabbath sees himself to be on a mission of awakening people to erotic truth of their 
lives which they try to suppress.®®® It never becomes definitely clear in which way 
his suffering relates to his mission. It may simply have uprooted him and thereby 
made the lure of society unattractive to him. But his mission is not one of mere 
sulking; he is positively convinced of its necessity. If there is any blame that he feels 
he ought to take, thus he points out, then it would be the blame that he has not carried 
his antagonistic mission far enough.
To everyone he had ever horrified, to the appalled w h o ’d considered him  a dangerous man, 
loathsom e, degenerate, and gross, he cried, “N o t at all! M y failure is fa iling to have gone far 
enoughl M y failure is not having  gone fu r th er!” (ST  208  [em phasis P .R .])
Sabbath insists that the crisis he engenders is already inherent in society. Sabbath 
does not attempt to impose a crisis on the people whom he reproaches; he merely 
exposes the hypocrisy of it. In his discussion with his former friend Norman, he
The allusion to Marquis de Sade is also an indication o f  this (ST 332),
“Secular spirituality, that’s all he [Sabbath’s friend Norman] exuded -  maybe they all did, the 
producers, the agents, the mega-deal lawyers.” (ST 341)
It should be noted that Sabbath, although he is a circumcised Jew, relates to a Christian idea in this 
passage (“evangelist”). In the face o f  his arthritis, he also sympathises with Jesus Christ: “A nail 
through either palm you sympathize with when you suffer osteoarthritis in both hands.” (ST 171) It is 
the imtHutionalised form o f  (Christian?) religion that he objects to. Upon Nikki’s expressions o f 
detest against “Priests, rabbis, clergymen and their stupid fairy tale” he flatly responds “1 am no fan o f  
the clergy myself.” (ST 110)
A record about Yisrael Baal Shem Tov, one o f  the founders o f  Hasidim, notes that his aim was “to 
establish harmony and unity.” (Rabinowicz (2000), 96)
Sabbath later remarks: “All I know how to do is to antagonize” (ST 143).
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points out that society would not react as strongly to him as it does, if the crisis were 
not already inherent in it.
That’s w hat I hear from  people all the tim e, peop le continuously  te llin g  m e that the great 
thing I w as called  to  in life  w as to cause pain. The w orld is ju st fly in g  along pain-free -  
happy-go-lucky hum anity o f f  on  one long h in-filled  holiday -  and then Sabbath is set dow n  
in life , and overn ight the p lace is transformed into a loon y  bin o f  tears. W hy is that? Can 
som eone exp lain  it to  m e? (ST  4 5 0 )
Sabbath despises the mediocrity and phoniness of the world in which he lives, 
particularly its “secular” spirituality.®®'’ We shall acquaint ourselves with Sabbath’s " ” 
own messianic spirituality.
Frequently, Sabbath gives himself names that indicate his self-understanding as 
a missionary or even a messiah. Pondering on his situation and his previous life, he 
esteems his performance to be satisfactory:
N ik k i hat run aw ay from him , R oseanna w as fed up w ith  him , but all in all, for a man o f  his 
stature, he had been  im probably successfu l. A scetic  M ickey  Sabbath, at it still in his sixties. 
The M onk o f  Fucking. T he E vangelist o f  Fornication. A d  m ajorem  D e i g loriam . (ST  60)®®^
As 4S the case with all of Sabbath’s acts and utterances, there is a deeper meaning 
attached to this self-description. Sabbath does not merely provoke or insult, he is 
convicted that he really is on a mission that consists of (erotic) transgressions for the 
glory of God -  which, again, is quite similar to the mission of the Sabbatians.
Towards the end of the novel, Sabbath introduces himself as “Rabbi Israel, the 
Baal Shem Tov -  the Master of God’s Good name.” (ST 402) This statement must be 
sheer irony, for Baal Schem Tov embodied everything that Sabbath despises.®®  ^ Yet 
of course Sabbath’s conviction about his mission is not as clearly defined as that of 
the Sabbatians; his life of transgression ultimately amounts to a withdrawl or a flight, 
whereas he is himself not absolutely sure what it actually is he is trying to escape 
from.
H is cock in ess, his se lf-exa lted  egoism , the m enacing charme o f  a potentially  v illa inous artist 
w ere insufferable to a lot o f  peop le and he m ade enem ies easily , including a number o f  
theatre professionals w ho believed  that his w as an unseem ly, brilliantly disgusting talent that 
had yet to d iscover a suitably seem ly  m eans o f  “d iscip lined” expression . Sabbath 
Antagonistes^^^, busted for ob scen ity  as far back as 1956. Sabbath A bsconditus, w hatever 
happened to him ? H is life w as a long flight from what? (ST  125)
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This passage is quite ambivalent particularly in terms of Sabbath’s religious calling; 
On the one hand, he calls himself Sabbath Absconditus, thus using a divine predicate 
for himself; on the other hand, he implicitly admits that the meaning of his 
antagonism is not at all clear?®®
As it is often the case, Sabbath is not sure whether his messianic call is part of 
the theatre he stages or whether it is real. His ascetism impacts on his friend Norman 
so strongly that it makes him wonder whether there is something religious about 
him.®®'
M aybe it w a sn ’t repulsion  at all that he [Norm an] felt but som ething like aw e at the sight o f  
w hite-bearded Sabbath, com e dow n from  his m ountain-tip like som e holy man w h o has 
renounced am bition and w orld ly  p ossession s. Can it be that there is som ething religious  
about m e? Has w hat I’ve  done -  i.e ., failed to do -  been sain tly?  (ST  141)
5.4. Sabbath on destruction
Having explored Sabbath’s (religious) “mission”, we shall now analyse how Sabbath 
adopts the idea of a necessary and ultimately constructive destruction. Spying 
through the personal belongings of the daughter of his friends Debbie, Sabbaths finds 
a poem by Yeats and Debbie’s note on this poem which endorse a view that, I 
assume, is tantamount to Sabbath’s own perception. Yeat’s poem reads
C ivilisation  is h ooped  together, brought 
Under a rule, under the sem blance o f  peace  
B y m anifold  illusion; but m an’s life is thought.
A nd he, despite h is terror, cannot cease  
R avening through century after century,
R avening, raging, and uprooting that he may com e  
Into the d esolation  o f  reality;
E gypt and G reece good -b ye, and good-bye, R om e!
Hermits upon M ount M eru or Everest,
C averned in night under drifted sn ow .
Or where that sn ow  and w in ter’s dreadful blast 
Beat dow n upon their naked bodies, know  
That day brings about the night, that before daw n  
H is g lo iy  and his m onum ents are gon e. (ST  164)
Civilisation is a leash on humanity that needs to be destroyed; thus Debbie comments 
in her notes:
Ultimately, it is suffering and death that Sabbath flees from. -  That Sabbath is actually following a 
mission can also be seen in his “dialogue” with his deceased mother, whose ghost appears to him. “All 
you ever wanted were whorehouses and whores. You have the ideology o f a pimp. You should have 
been one.” (ST 160) To which he replies by affirming that his “perspective” is indeed an (elaborate) 
ideology. "Ideology, no less. How knowing she had become in the afterlive. They must give courses.” 
(ST 160)
™  Sabbath implied earlier that there is point in his “descent” (ST 140), a point that Norman, trying to 
understand the history o f  Sabbath’s tragedy, entirely misses.
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T he them e o f  the p oem  is that m an is never satisfied un less he destroys all that he has 
created, e .g . the c iv iliza tion s o f  E gypt and R om e. (ST  165)
But destruction is not merely rebellion against society. It is also the destruction of a 
world that is naturally heading in the wrong direction -  a world in which “There is 
nothing that keeps its promise”®'’^ . When dashing through an underground station and 
reciting from Shakespeare’s King Lear, Sabbath concludes by affirming his desire to 
destroy the natural flow of things altogether; to destroy time. i
The train reached Grand Central. P eop le rushed for the open  doors. The girl w as alone.
Sabbath w as freed. ‘“ Pray y o u  n o w ,’” Sabbath shouted as he w andered o f f  the train alone, 
look ing in all d irections for N ik k i’s daughter.®'”  ‘“ Pray yo u  n o w ,” ’ he exclaim ed  to those  
standing back from  him  as he strode m ajestically  along the platform , shaking is cup out 
before him , ‘“ pray yo u  now  . . and then w ithout even  N ik k i’s daughter to prompt him , he i
rem em bered w hat is next, w ords that could  have m eant nothing at all to him in the theatre o f  
the B ow ery B asem en t Players in 1961: “ ‘Pray you  now , forget and forgive. I am old and 
fo o lish .’”
This w as true. It w as hard for him  to b elieve  that he w as sim ulating any longer, though not 
im possib le.
T hou’It com e no more;
N ever, never, never, never, never.
Destroy the clock . Join the crowd. (ST  303)
The text neatly draws Sabbath into his own recitation, turning theatre into reality.
Initially, double quotation marks indicate that Sabbath is rehearsing quotations.
Finally, the quotation marks disappear. The lament for Cordelia becomes the lament 
for Nikki. The passage negates his desire expressed earlier on: his desire to escape 
the merciless progression of time.
Turning life back like a  c lo ck  in the fall. Just taking it dow n o f f  the w all and w inding it back 
and w inding it back until your dead all appear like standard tim e. (ST  3 0 2 )
If, thus says Sabbath’s logic, the harm caused by time cannot be healed by winding 
back the clock peacefully, then destruction is the only way there is left. I shall briefly 
summarise where this leaves us. For the Sabbatians, the destruction of the Torah is 
the only way to be true to it; for Sabbath, the rage against the rules is the only resort.
Sabbath’s self-understanding is both similar to and diverse form that of the 
Sabbatianists. Their beliefs were Gnostic; it was the opposition between this world 
and the world that the Torah promised which led them to disregard the world and 
those aspects of the Torah that referred to worldly conduct. Sabbath and the 
Sabbatianism share the awareness that God’s relation to the world contains extremely
2'(o the title o f  the first part o f  the book.
Sabbath (errlngly?) assumed to have spotted his missing w ife’s daughter Nikki.
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destructive elements. Sabbath, the antagonistic messiah, shares the assumption that 
the established orders must be transgressed for religious reasons. Thus, in spite of 
differences that remain®'’®, Sabbath’s Theater can be seen as a contemporary close 
analogy to the Sabbatian logic of constructive destruction.
Harold Bloom is right in pointing out that there is a significant difference between Roth’s 
antinomism and that o f  heretical branches o f  Judaism (Bloom (1986), 2; see note 229): Roth opposes 
human values; heresy opposes the Torah. But one should add that it is the Torah as it has hitherto 
been conceived  o /w hich  Sabbatianism opposes.
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6.Su mmary and Outlook
6.1. Summary
In this essay, I have emphasised the meaningflilness of destruction as a possible 
response to suffering. Have I thus argued that destruction is good and desirable? Not 
at all. One can hardly overemphasise that destruction was looked at as a response to 
suffering, suffering being already there. The necessity of destruction is by no means. 
to be welcomed; it follows from the presence of suffering. Suffering, too, must never 
be welcomed -  it must be fought. I shall define the status of my results subsequent to 
a short résumé.
I began by pointing out that life does entail suffering. A variety of responses to 
suffering can be imagined and indeed can be found. My emphasis lies on the idea (or 
hope) that suffering can be reversed. The idea of reversal, which is the substratum of 
the present study, can already be found in the lamentation psalms. Very shortly, I 
commented on accounts for suffering that tend to glorify suffering rather than 
envision the reversal that will lead to its end, as have been pronounced by Meister 
Eckhart, St. John of the Cross and Emmanuel Lévinas. The reader may find that I 
dismiss these respectable and highly influential reflections about suffering far too 
quickly. The rejection of any account for suffering that resembles a glorification of 
suffering can hardly be defended against those who are drawn to these viewpoints. 1 
stubbornly insist on my belief that suffering is never “good”. This belief rests on 
nothing but a personal intuition that will not be communicable to those who do not 
feel the same, though. Once I have made this pathetic decision, the rest of the book 
proceeds by interpretation and discussion.
I interpreted texts by Soren Kierkegaard, Theodor W. Adorno, Franz Kaflca, 
Gershom Scholem and Walter Benjamin. The reading of Kierkegaard leaves us with 
very diverse results. Some of the basic assumptions of Kierkegaard appear to be 
extremely problematic, whereas the literary qualities of his writings that are related 
to suffering are highly stimulating.
Theodor W. Adorno’s reading of Kierkegaard teaches us less about 
Kierkegaard’s writings themselves than about the possibility of reading a text against 
the grain -  whether or not this distinction makes any sense in the first place cannot 
be discussed here, for this would require me to rehearse the whole debate on 
“hermeneutics vs. deconstruction”, which is beyond the scope of the specific 
question at stake in this essay. Either way Adorno’s reading of Kierkegaard enacts a 
logic of constructive destruction.
The term “constructive destruction” is a quote from Kafka’s aphorisms, written 
subsequent to his falling ill o f tuberculosis, while the logic of constructive 
destruction can also be found in earlier texts, particularly about his struggle for his 
liaison with Felice and about the necessity of death. According to his own view, 
Kafka did not find what he was looking for. But this “failure” of his is no mere
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failure, if it is itself understood from the perspective of necessary negativity. This is 
precisely the view taken by Gershom Scholem, who presents a theological reading of 
Kafka which I think is much more profound than recent ones. Therefore, the latter 
are mentioned only in passing. Scholem creates a link between Kafka’s work and a 
“heretical Kabbalah”, of which the Sabbatian movement is a prime example. The 
Sabbatian movement, again, operates with a logic of “construction and destruction”, 
as Scholem frequently points out. Maurice Blanchot is the only author known to me 
who seems to draw the connection between Kafka’s reference to “constructive 
destruction” and Scholem’s corresponding remarks about the logic of the Sabbatian- - 
movement, though this link is at best implied in Blanchot’s work, and never 
elaborated on.
Finally, by presenting a close reading of Philip Roth’s Sabbath’s Theater, I 
arrive in our contemporary condition, or rather the abyss that may loom underneath 
it. The question whether or not Philip Roth had the Sabbatians in mind when he 
opted for the title of this book does not excite me very much. Either way the analogy 
between the character Sabbath and that of Sabbatai Sevi is interesting.
And yet the overcoming of suffering may appear to be impossible -  time and 
again. In this case, detours must be allowed. The detour that I took has led me to the 
notion of constructive destruction. Constructive destructive is the impossible 
possibility that suffering be fought even if there is no ground on which to do so -  
even if every soldier in this battle has already been overcome by it. Constructive 
destruction reverses the irresistible power of suffering against suffering itself. We 
cannot simply enact this constructive destruction, precisely because it involves 
incalculable elements. But we can learn about it by reading authors who have 
immersed themselves into it. The writings of these authors are models for the 
overcoming of suffering. A “model” can be understood as a means of exploration 
that does not suggest to reflect reality, but that rather constructs an initially heuristic 
structural analogy (Isomorphy) between different areas.®'’®
In a less scientistic kind of way, one could say that my work is heading towards 
rules of art (“Kunstregeln”) rather than towards technical rules. Schleiermacher 
distinguishes between these two kinds of rules by pointing out that rules of art leave 
it to the agent to apply the rules, whereas technical rules include directions regarding 
the particular application of these rules.®'’'’ “Constructive destruction” cannot ever 
simply be applied. It can inspire our perception of particular situations and 
possibilities to act. Just how constructive destruction comes into play cannot be 
prescribed.
It may be felt that I am evading the decent quest for the reality of my idea and 
its applicability, allowing for the suspicion that constructive destruction simply has 
no reality, and is finally nothing but an unnecessary detour. Maybe. Maybe Soren 
Kierkegaard, Franz Kafka, Gershom Scholem, Theodor W. Adorno, Maurice
Wolters (1995), 912. J
See Schleiermacher (1983). I1
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Blanchot, Philip Roth (and indeed many others®'’^ ) have been wrestling with ghosts.
If that were the case, then so has modernity, which is related to (amongst others) 
those writers closely. Let me suggest to my imaginary opponent that we use the 
principle of constructive destruction -  the principle of using the negative for its own 
overcoming -  in order to overcome the ghost that apparently infects discourses with 
the superstition that the negative were any good. Let’s turn constructive destruction 
against constructive destruction; if constructive destruction really is a regrettable 
detour, then we should find out what is wrong with key exponents of our age that 
they continuously seem to take this detour in the first place. In order to find out about" - 
this, we must explore it closely. This is what I have tried to do.
If we can get rid of negativity and negative dialectics by any means, then let us, 
by all means. I would have preferred to close with a straightforward recipe for the 
eradication of suffering, or to put it more carefiilly, with a recipe for a truly joyful 
life in spite of the existence of suffering in our lives, or, at any rate, in our world. I 
wish to emphasise that the vagueness and indecisiveness of my “results” does not 
pay homage to “postmodern” ethereality; rather, it simply reflects the nature of that 
which I can say without fearing that I offer a foothold which life will unconsciously 
shrug off like a blowfly. Am I saying that theology, in order to avoid promising too 
much, remains an exercise that can do nothing but explore the little of hope there can 
be found within our realm and to become practised and indeed to train others in this 
very exploration? Peut-être.
6.2. O u tlo o k
Many interesting questions had to be left out in order to maintain the focus of the 
essay, for example the notion of lament; “Lament” could be a form of expression that 
responds to the incommunicability of suffering.®'’^  In his short piece “On Lament and 
Lamentation”®'’®, Gershom Scholem points out that lament is the zero-point of 
language, the point where language ceases to refer and only “means” itself anymore; 
a notion that, as I have mentioned earlier on, Scholem may have adopted from 
Benjamin’s essay “On Language as such and the Language of Human Beings”®'’®.
Schopenhauer®'’'  and Nietzsche hover above many of the aspects that are taken 
into account.®^’’ Nietzsche’s romanticist aestheticism links him to Soren
E.g. Euripides, Martin Luther, Walter Benjamin.
I commented on the communicative problem at the beginning o f this study.
Scholem (1995). This text was edited only a few years ago and has rarely been discussed. See 
Mosès / W eigel (2000). The messianic aspect o f Scholem’s ideas could contribute to the 
“futurological” dilemma that I have observed in Janowski’s discussion o f  the complaint-psalms (see 
above section 1.2).
Benjamin (1986); see above note 200.
Schopenhauer defended his negativist philosophy against criticism by responding flatly that 
experience supports his view (Schopenhauer (1996), 744). A critical appreciation would have to 
explore precisely what experiences Schopenhauer had in mind and whether his conclusions are 
legitimate.
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Kierkegaard’s “Aesthete”; the connection of aestheticism, the Dionysian and 
suffering appears to be present in Sabbath’s Theater under the surface. In this 
respect, Nietzsche’s préfiguration of the “modern” ailment could further illumine the 
genesis of contemporai-y suffering. Explorations e.g. of contemporary popular culture 
could deepen our understanding of the particular forms of negative experiences in the 
present. Indeed they could support my claim that reflexive detours may be necessary, 
because our age is not, as it may appear, immersed in immediacy, hedonism and 
aestheticism, but is rather highly reflexive and complex. Of the countless possible 
examples, I wish to mention only Sofia Coppola’s Lost in Translatior^^\ This film’-r - % 
could be linked to the readings that have been undertaken on several levels. To begin 
with, Walter Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator” could be interpreted with 
reference to the idea of “translation” that is adopted in the film. The true task of 
translation is (close to) impossible according to Walter Benjamin; it is only through 
the crisis of translation that translation can reach its task.®^ ® Translation is not only a 
linguistic process; “hermeneutics”, the academic discipline that is amongst others 
concerned with the question how concepts can be translated from one frame of 
reference to another, engages with the question how the conditio humana is affected 
by changing times. Coppola’s Film Lost in Translation is a vivid portrayal of the 
melancholy and the sense of loss that comes with the failure of the process of 
translation. The two characters are unable to move on from one “sphere” to another;
Bob is unable to adapt to the changes of his marriages that the birth of his children 
has brought; Charlotte is unable to adapt to the rather empty jet-set life that her 
husband, a successful photographer, is immersed in. The utter aestheticism of Tokyo 
in the 21st century is the background against which the mourning for the real and for 
meaningful individual history is being staged. Bob and Charlotte are “lost in 
translation”, stuck between one sphere and another -  in a kind of way that is very 
similar to the loss described by Hermann Hesse’s “genius of suffering”®^®, the 
Steppenwolf^" .^
Friedrich Nietzsche pointed out that the suffering individual must speak “yes” to suffering and 
destruction. See Nietzsche (1909) 128f.); Sporl (2002), 218 and Angenvoort (1995), 670ff.683 et. al.
Coppola (2003).
“For the sake o f  pure language [the translator] breaks through decayed barriers o f  his own language 
which is under the spell o f  another, to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation o f  
that work.” (Benjamin (1986c), 80)
Hesse (2001), 15. Suffering is, thus the Steppenwolf quotes approvingly from Nietzsche, “a 
reminder o f  a higher state” (Hesse (2001), 12), which o f  course reminds one o f  the medieval 
mysticism o f  suffering (see above chapter 1).
Hesse (2001), 28: “‘[•■■] A man in the Middle Ages would detest the whole mode o f our present 
day life as something far more horrible and cruel, far more than barbarous. Every age, every culture, 
eveiy custom and tradition has its own character, its own weakness and its own strength, its beauties 
and cruelties; it accepts certain sufferings as matters o f course, puts up patiently with certain evils. 
Human life is reduced to real suffering, to hell, only when two ages, two cultures and religions 
overlap. A man o f  the classical age who had to live in medieval times would suffocate miserably just 
as a savage does in the middle o f our civilization. Now there are times when a whole generation is 
caught in this way between two ages, between two modes o f  life and thus loses the feeling for itself, 
for the self-evident, for all morals, for being safe and innocent. Naturally, everyone does not feel this 
equally strongly. A nature such as Nietzsche’s had to suffer our present ills more than a generation in 
advance. What he had to go through alone and misunderstood, thousands suffer today.’” There is thus
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In the introduction, I have indicated that relief from suffering must be sought by 
many means. In these closing remarks, I would like to at least mention that the logic 
of constructive destruction, particularly the logic of using the negative against the 
negative, is also employed in therapy. Paul Watzlawick’s concept of the paradoxical 
intervention aims to help people out of their misery by creating paradoxes within 
their mechanisms of perpetuating their own ailment.®^^
These issues pressingly beg the question. Less obvious, but possibly also very 
momentous, is the question how these analyses about suffering relate to theology. Or 
rather, if one was to concede that these exercises can themselves be seen as theology, , % . 
what remains to be seen is how all this relates to Christian dogmatics; I am thinking 
particularly of harmatiology, Christology, and soteriology. The Christian tradition of 
mortification and mors mortis is intrinsically related to these deliberations. The 
readings that I presented should allow one to reconsider what has traditionally been 
called “existential dialectics”. Broadly speaking, they could help us to link 
theological, philosophical and theological traditions to the experience that I assume 
is the most pressing of all human experiences, i.e., that of suffering. On the whole, 
these ideas are heading towards a “dialectical” theology in the literal sense of the 
term. The word “dialectics” emphasises that suffering shall never have the last word.
We are hoping that death will be devoured and that all tears will be wiped away.
a deep melancholy in his simple statement “I was not a modern man, nor an old-fashioned one either,” 
(op. cit., 187) The Steppenwolf is lost between the ages precisely because his parents were unable to 
destroy that in him which does not belong to their generations: “ [...]  the attempt to destroy the 
personality and to break the will did not succeed.” (Op. cit. 15) Later in the novel, the Steppenwolf 
experiences a “destruction” o f  his personality o f another kind, i.e., a destruction o f  all the aversions 
against “popular” forms o f live that he learns to appreciate (within certain limits, that is; see op. cit. 
152); the “pieces into which his so-called personality” fractures are eventually used as tokens in a 
game o f  chess (op. cit. 223); thus, destruction is turned into play.
Watzlawick /  Helmick / Jackson describe “therapeutic double-binds” that create short circuits 
within the illusoiy assumptions o f  the (e.g. paranoid) patients, thus destroying these assumptions from 
within and clearing the way for the understanding o f  the actual conflict that may have created the 
paranoid projection. See Watzlawick / Helmick / Jackson (1967), 242.
■■?
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